The perennial involvement of religious traditions in economic, social, and political events is well attested. Unfortunately, the study of these aspects of religious traditions lags far behind the concern for doctrinal discussion, almost as though the actual historical development of the tradition is a perhaps inevitable, if frequently neither consonant nor salutary, by-product of the doctrinal center. In this context we are refreshed by Neil McMullin's recent discussion of the importance of political and social aspects of Japanese religious behavior and the dangers of fragmenting the historical record of lived religiosity according to the politically sectarian prism of our own historiographic bias (MCMULLIN 1989a). In this essay McMullin expands a critique raised in his Buddhism and the State in Sixteenth-Century Japan (MCMULLIN 1984, pp. 3–9) regarding the relative importance of institution, ritual, and doctrine, in the context of both the historical record and our modern historiographical viewpoint (see also McMULLIN 1989b, the reply of Gary EBERSOLE 1989, and McMULLIN response [1989c]; also McMULLIN 1989d). His arguments, although perhaps overstated to serve a provocative purpose, are a valuable corrective to the lack of attention these areas have received in the past. It is indeed important to remember that religions are constituted as much by what religious people actually do as by what they say and write.

Being myself primarily concerned with the economic and social institutions of the Buddhist tradition and their relation (or lack thereof) to normative doctrinal and cultic statements, I was especially interested in how McMullin would theoretically relate his concern for the societal dimension of Japanese religions to the spiritual and doctrinal claims of the practitioners. I was particularly intrigued as I was interested at the time in the role that doctrine plays in modern Japanese Buddhism (HUBBARD 1988a, 1990), an aspect of contemporary Japanese religiosity far more
neglected in scholarship than the societal dimensions of premodern Japanese religion.\(^1\)

Unfortunately, in his zeal to valorize the social and political aspects of Japanese religious traditions McMullin presents a rather sanitized picture of the religious person that renders virtually all aspects of religious tradition merely a functional response to other causative social, political, and economic phenomena (pp. 8–10, 25–28), consigns doctrine to "last place" in a tidy ranking of the relative importance of different aspects of religious traditions (p. 12), avers interest in doctrine to be found only among the elite, among class imperialists exporting their bias of the "Great Man" version of history (pp. 21–22), or among psychopathological Westerners seeking Eastern therapy (p. 28), and, not surprisingly in view of his dismissal of doctrine, proffers a W. C. Smith-inspired version of the oneness of all Japanese religions, finding the distinctions among different traditions based on and contained within the "great ideas" of the "great men" not evidenced in the actual historical record (pp. 4–8, 23–25).

McMullin breaks his discussion into a set of historical questions (points regarding the actual historical record) and another set of historiographical questions (questions about why scholarship has treated the historical record as it has). The historiographical questions are clearly prior, however—a point that undergirds McMullin's analysis. He reminds us, for example, that "Religious Studies itself furthers certain views and values that are in fact indissociable from certain ideological/political ones," and, paraphrasing Roland Barthes, that "the university critique, in spite of its professed objectivity, is postulated upon an ideology as much as any of the types of interpretative criticism that it accuses of systematic bias and prejudice" (pp. 20–21; 1989b, p. 92). This is, of course, simply the caution widely held in the academy that, because the observer mediates the observed (or even participates in and changes the observed), it is incumbent upon that observer to understand her own mediating process; this position frequently includes the related claims that there are no actions free of political and/or ideological import (1989c, p. 248). This claim, necessarily self-referential, is thereby also as prescriptive as it is descriptive. Needless to say, not all hold this position, and even among those that do there is still great disagreement regarding precisely where the "other" exists in relation to the observer, ranging

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\(^1\) Although for the most part I will follow McMullin's lead and restrict my comments to methodological concerns in non-Japanese sources dealing with premodern Japanese religions, I do share McMullin's awareness that his comments apply equally to the modern Japanese religious scene (pp. 12, 17), and so I include occasional comments on the contemporary scene as well. In the citations that follow, a page reference without author's name or date is to be understood as from McMullin 1989a.
from an external and objective "out there" to a purely subjective and idealist inner meaning that needs no historical referent at all. The backlash against the universities by the former U.S. Secretary of Education and the furor over the politicization of the curriculum and questions of a core curriculum are but a few examples of the very real and very bitter nature of these disputes. Happily, I feel no need to challenge McMullin's assertion, as it is a stance that I wholeheartedly endorse—the difficult and often rancorous process of making explicit the vested interests in our scholarship can only be for the best. The difference between us lies in our assessments of the importance of doctrine in the constitution of the religious person and the religious community.

The Great Man Thesis

What ideology does McMullin find dominant in the treatment of Japanese religiosity? First and foremost, McMullin sees that our "cognitive limitations" are those imposed by the hagiography of the "great man" thesis, which regards religious traditions (and particularly Buddhism) only in terms of the elite doctrinal tradition, severing the ahistorical psyche from the historical "physic" (pp. 21-22). From his reversal of this bias, that is, from his dismissal of the doctrinal and reconstruction of the historical, there follow, I believe, the four points he addresses in his essay: 1) a repudiation of doctrinally based sectarianism; 2) his understanding of religious behavior and hence religious tradition as primarily a functional response to other social, political, and economic situations; 3) his exiling of doctrine to last place in importance (behind ritual and institution); and 4) his picture of the religious person as wholly involved, religiously, in the social and political realms (and the political person equally driven by religious notions). While there is much to agree with in his analysis, I fear that several of his points imply even more problematic stands.

I agree that the preponderance of doctrinal studies tends to privilege the purveyors of those doctrines and as such is a significant impediment to our understanding of Japanese religious behavior. It is also no doubt indicative of the academy's vested interest in privileging the intellectual discourse of the past at the expense of other dimensions of the religious

2 Considering McMullin's emphasis on the historical, it is interesting that he cites Roland Barthes in this regard, as the *Empire of Signs*, considered a seminal work by many, is a self-admitted narcissistic fantasy having nothing to do with historical, philosophical, cultural, or political Japan (Barthes 1982, pp. 3-4). In truth, delightful and stimulating as this work is, it tells us only about Roland Barthes, and the joke is on anybody who thinks that his constructed "faraway" is intended to represent Japan. Barthes gives us one extreme of the "objective-world-out-there" vs. "the only meaning is subjectively constructed meaning" argument.
life. Yet in restoring a balance we must be careful lest we go too far and end up with the same asymmetry, only in a different direction. That is, if the point were simply that we pay too much attention to the masters and their doctrine and not enough to that of the rank-and-file practitioner, it would be well taken. It often seems to be assumed, however, that only the “great men” are concerned with doctrine, and ipso facto the kind of history of Buddhism that deals with doctrinal questions is necessarily an elitist venture. If, as I suggest below, doctrine has a much wider meaning, then, just as the historical physic of the disembodied master demands resurrection, so, too, does the belief structure and spirituality of the average follower demand acknowledgment. Then, perhaps, the “doctrinalized, spiritualized, other-worldlyized, and individualized” (p. 22) aspect of Japanese religiosity might be reclaimed with great benefit precisely for our understanding of its ideological, and hence institutional and cultic, implications. Simply put, I would suggest that we need to avoid a facile identification of doctrine as the exclusive domain of the elite. There are other significant difficulties with McMullin’s dismissal of the doctrinal aspects of Japanese religiosity, and because this seems a dominant structural element of his historiography, I will address this before further discussion of his critique of the “great man” bias.

Doctrine, as approvingly quoted from Frits Staal, is “a matter confined to scholarly monks or... reserved for Western converts, anthropologists, and tourists” (pp. 10-11). In McMullin’s own words, the “disproportionate number of studies of Japanese Buddhist doctrines and masters” is occasioned “for existential or therapeutic reasons,” a “psycho-pathology” for which he recommends several diagnoses (p. 28). More important than doctrine, he claims, was (and is) ritual, the utilitarian pursuit of worldly benefits such as stability of the state, good health or recovery from illness, career advancement, and the like (pp. 11-12).³

³ This is, I believe, similar to the epistemic privileging of the poor that forms one important strand of liberation theology, and a dominant theme in Korean minjung thought.

⁴ McMullin cites Hardacre’s work on the Reiyokai (1984) as evidence that the “preeminence of ritual in Japanese religion continues to this day” (p. 11). Although in this work Hardacre considers doctrine in a restricted fashion similar to McMullin, in more recent work she advances the analytic concept of “world view,” which she calls the “formalized conceptualization of self in relation to physical existence, the social order, and the cosmos plus associated behavior patterns” (HARDACRE 1986, p. 9). This notion of a dynamic worldview (which she sees to include strong affinities with neo-Confucian ideas of the self) is, insofar as it is localized in the teachings of specific religious groups (including all forms of socialization/indoctrination), close to what I mean by doctrine. I simply maintain that such worldviews have always been considered doctrinally based, i.e., based on teachings articulated within specific traditions.

⁵ Although I do not have access to the work of Staal cited here, McMullin’s description of rituals as fulfilling this-worldly goals directly contradicts much of Staal’s published work of
Hence, "were we to rank religious institutions, rituals, and doctrines in order of their relative importance in pre-modern Japanese societies, institutions would rank first, rituals second, and doctrines last" (p. 12).

It is somewhat difficult to understand just what McMullin means to demote when he calls doctrine last in importance. The single reference he makes is to the "great ideas" of "enlightenment, buddha-nature, emptiness, and so forth" (p. 22), or, if we may infer from his approbative citation of Staal, "concepts with . . . truth-functional overtones" (p. 11). Doctrine is certainly both more and less than this. In terms of content, doctrine encompasses far more than these particular ideas—in the case of Buddhism it also includes normative, textual ideas about rewards (heavenly and earthly); economic and political values; how to behave towards your parents; make rain, and destroy your enemies; and even correct positions for homosexual love (Schalow 1987). Therefore it is also less than the philosophically complex propositions that McMullin seems to favor. Doctrine is simply something taught, especially something taught as a principle or tenet of a given system or institution. It is the worldview and practices taught within a tradition, and as such it is the object of individual and communal belief insofar as that belief is directed towards a particularized institution or tradition. Note the institution- or tradition-specific aspect of doctrine.

I hope McMullin will clarify this for us, for though he dismisses doctrine he certainly accords belief in religious notions a great importance in both ritual and institution. Comments such as the following are sprinkled throughout his discussion:

- Powerful families searched for other supports for their positions of power and privilege, and one type of support that they discovered and patronized was certain kinds of esoteric rituals that they believed to contain great power. (p. 10, emphasis added)
- the ways of thinking of those people [the formulators of the earliest Japanese political statements] . . . were profoundly shaped by and imbued with religious notions. (p. 13, emphasis added)
- the notion of the ōbō is an Indian Buddhist one (Skt. rājadharma), as is, of course, the concept of buппō (Skt. buddhadharma). (p. 14)
- all notions about authority were politico-religious. (p. 15, emphasis added)
- many people (the ikkō monto 一向門徒, the hokke monto 法華門徒, the last fifteen years (e.g., Staal 1979, 1989) which considers ritual to be "meaningless," pure activity with no pragmatic utility, and for its own sake rather than goal-oriented.

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6 It is also hard to understand his sense of "important," though I infer that he means something like "has the greatest causal impact in the development of Japanese religious traditions." Cf. McMullin 1989b, p. 90.
and others), preferring to live in a socio-political structure based on certain classical religious notions... resisted incorporation into the bushi structures. (p. 18, emphasis added)

What is doctrine but the object of belief, the content of religious notions, especially “classical religious notions”? Is doctrine really limited to elite notions of Buddha-nature? In other words, he argues well for the elimination of the distinction between religious and political, yet seems to want to retain an equally problematic distinction between doctrine and belief as well as doctrine and ideology. If we understand that religious doctrine generally, and classical Buddhist doctrine specifically, includes exactly such worldly considerations as belief in powerful magic, religious notions about government, and ideological structures relating to power and position, then perhaps the stigma he attaches to doctrinal study can be eliminated. We might not like it, but in classical Buddhist teaching the superior birth (the physical environment that provided the best access to enlightenment) was that of a wealthy, politically and militarily powerful, high-caste male. That such teachings (doctrines) were the object of belief and made possible the construction of institutions that best furthered those goals doubly underscores the importance of doctrine in the development of Japanese religious traditions: firstly for the simple purpose of correctly assessing the development of the tradition in full historical context, and secondly to allow for cogent, contemporary appraisal of that same tradition—necessarily, therefore, including the doctrines (“religious notions”) that support that tradition. In other words, I wholly agree that there is a tendency to “preserve religion from the muck and mire of politics and economics” (p. 33), but to my mind this is precisely because the ideological aspects of the doctrinal (and hence the economic, political, social) have not been explored, in spite of the tradition’s explicit arguments to the contrary. Although a neo-Weberian view might continue to see Asian religions as doctrinally and/or actually world-denying, the fact is that Buddhist doctrine has never denied the world, either metaphysically or institutionally. If McMullin’s evaluation of the relative importance of doctrine vis-a-vis institution, ritual, and state is accepted, contrary to his aims the historiographical rift between the doctrinal and worldly will only grow, making an accurate assessment of power structures less likely than ever.

7 W. C. Smith argues a stronger rejection of the propositional belief in order to show that the underlying structures of faith and practice of the world’s religions are convergent. Although McMullin does not seem interested in soteriological convergence, he does share in the desire to downplay or eliminate the differences between traditions that, for him, exist merely at the formal, doctrinal level.

8 The assumption that doctrine is the province of the elite, and worldly concerns that of the general populace, is an attitude that pervades the conservative reaction of the traditional
Without an understanding of the power of doctrine or teachings in the belief structures of individuals and communities it also seems impossible to understand why so many could assent to and actively support what were (and are) often emotionally, physically, and economically oppressive institutions. To cite McMullin's point that Saichō kept his monks on the mountain primarily for strategic rather than religious purposes, it should be noted that the stated, normative, purpose of Buddhist monastic life is to "tame the untamed." I would venture that Saichō believed, in a doctrinal and propositional way, in keeping his monks to himself for twelve years precisely to tame them, so that they would not be subject to the temptations of the former capital, obviously far more exciting than the early days of Mt. Hiei; so that they would also be well trained in his idea of what monks were about and able to defend their own institutional existence; and also so that his institutional power base would grow and make possible the imposition of his vision. That such an understanding constitutes ideology is perhaps a modern analysis, but the doctrinal base of that ideology is not. Indeed, the economic and political status of a monk was vaunted in the earliest strata of Buddhist literature as the "immediate fruit, in this world, of the life of a recluse" (Rhys Davids 1977, pp. 76–77), and the Buddhist institutional rules and regulations reveal an intimate appreciation of real-world involvement and a sophisticated understanding of the monastic community's vested interest in that involvement; Saichō's personal and creative encounter with that doctrinally normative tradition in situ fueled his response and the institutional expression of that response. We simply cannot deny the doctrinal sanction of worldly compensation in Buddhism, or, indeed, in most traditions. That doctrine functions in relation to power is well

Buddhist denominations against the new religious movements of this century as "merely interested in worldly benefits." It is also no doubt a significant factor in keeping doctrinally oriented Buddhologists from this important field (though the construct itself is largely the product of the social sciences). We may cringe when the male medium in Tachikawa tells the supplicant that the problems caused by her husband's affair will only get worse if she continues to complain and that she should forgive her husband (making the victim the perpetrator), but we must also recognize that this is an explicitly doctrinal statement of karma and compassion. Indeed, Hardacre's comments to the contrary notwithstanding (cited by McMullin 1989a, p. 11), teachings in the form of home meetings, spirit guidance sessions, regularly scheduled lectures, study groups, and the like constitute an inordinately important mode of participation and cultivation in new religious movements. Although the mode in which they address the angst of capitalist culture relates to the specific anxieties engendered by that culture (money, family, gender, work), any serious investigation reveals the classical doctrinal positions that underlie those teachings. To ignore this (the natural outcome of an "elite-only" view of doctrine) inevitably reduces the beliefs of the less philosophically inclined religious practitioners to a functional social response, a reduction usually beyond the practitioner's recognition and hence, to my mind, of little descriptive merit as well. That it so often does so in the name of reconstructing their story seems an especially egregious form of privileging our discourse at their expense.
understood within the tradition and it is in this relation to worldly goals, construed for the fictive grouping (sectarianism), that the doctrinal becomes ideological.9

Thus, to assume that interest in doctrine on the part of either the scholar or the practitioner is *ipso facto* interest in the "other-worldly" or, conversely, to hold that interest in the world and its benefits is not doctrinally related, fits neither the practitioner's view of their worldview nor the normative elucidation of that worldview. It is, to borrow a colleague's phrase, a form of the "We think, therefore they are" sort of intellectual imperialism, and it has as little chance of restoring the dignity of the many hidden stories of Japanese history as the focus on the elite (GEWERTZ 1990).10 It is a prejudice against utility-value practices that keeps us from seeing the normative doctrinal position that wholly affirms the cultivation of rituals "believed to contain great power" and institutions "shaped by and imbued with religious notions"; it is only assent to the bifurcation of *shusse-riyaku* (other-worldly? transcendental?) and *genze-riyaku* that puts doctrine onto some unreachable peak scaled only by the elite.

McMullin's second major point about doctrine is that it is not prior to but subsequent to action. Again, he cites Staal to the effect that ritual does not need (depend on) doctrine or belief, and the latter serves (subsequently) to explain ritual. "It appears to be assumed," he writes, "that what people thought and believed was prior to and more important than what they practiced," an assumption that "may have characterized some religious traditions in the pre-modern world, but not the Japanese" (p. 29). Such an epistemological claim regarding both cognition and propositional belief needs further clarification, particularly in view of his other claims regarding the importance of belief and classical religious notions in determining ritual and political action. The only way that I can understand both claims is to assume that, whereas generally McMullin takes belief to have a more inclusive scope than that offered by doctrine, in this case the scope of "what people thought and believed" is meant to be restricted to complex philosophical arguments (his notion of doctrine). Although it is certainly reasonable to assume that the vast majority of participants in the ritual and institutional life of a tradition

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9 This is the way I use "ideology" in this paper, to mean ideas and structures that manifest or express the vested interests of a group in relation to power and control. Inasmuch as some see all actions and ideas as representing vested interests, "ideology" is a most abused term these days, almost mandatory in any analysis, but thereby also losing much of its descriptive power.

10 Recent work has suggested that, while perhaps the propositional claims of religious believers should be assessed by theologians and philosophers, the social scientist must nonetheless take seriously the constructive power of belief (BELL 1989; COMAROFF 1985; EARHART 1969).
have no knowledge of the often complex explicatory apparatus that develops around them, this does not in any way entail that they have no institutionally directed beliefs, no evidence or reasons for their participation. Part of this difficulty can be resolved, I think, if we realize that, whereas the object of belief is conceptual and involves propositional statements, the object of faith or practice (including ritual participation) is rather the sought experience or result—rain, power, protection, health, union with the deity, and the like. That the object of practice is not propositional, however, does not mean that such practice involves no propositional belief. Participation in rituals and other practices involves belief in their efficacy, belief that they will work as expected or guaranteed, as taught. This kind of belief is every bit as doctrinal, normative, and propositional as belief in Buddha-nature. Indeed, the beginnings of Buddhism in Japan are intimately tied to the belief in the power of the Buddha-deity's relics which in turn was seen to authenticate the rest of the package, including scripture.

The notion that propositions and concepts are subsequent to experiences and actions and hence less important or significant is argued by many, notably those who wish to eliminate doctrinal differentiation for one reason or another. Before we grant the subsequent status of thought and belief, however, we need a convincing argument against the position that avers all of our experience to be mediated experience, that is, influenced by and/or incorporating prior cognitive structures, including propositional belief structures. Some evidence or examples would also be of interest, and, as he allows that this consequential model might not characterize all religious traditions, so would an example of a people that he sees to put beliefs prior to practice. The need for clarification of this issue is great, as the idea of a uniquely Japanese priority of experience or action is very close to that found in various strains of Nihonjinron, from that which stresses the pure phenomenalism of the Japanese psyche and the "no-mind" of the Japanese martial arts aesthetic to the neuro-linguistic theories of Tsunoda Tadanobu.

Finally, even if we do restrict our usage of doctrine to those esoteric notions of Buddha-nature and emptiness propounded by the "great men" and grant that these were neither understood nor of moment for the vast majority of Japanese, it still does not follow in any way that such ideas and those that propounded them were not important in the development of Japanese religion. An inordinate amount of influence and institutional development can be credited to a small number of individuals. It seems hard to escape the conclusion, for example, that the importance of Saichō’s vision of the Lotus Sūtra was indeed a crucial factor in his persistent efforts to establish a Mahāyāna ordination procedure, an event with far-reaching consequences for the spiritual, doctrinal, ritual, and institutional development of Japanese religiosity. Although
it is certainly important to investigate the doctrinal, institutional, and ritual routinization of the founder's charisma (acculturated religious institution), the fact is that Saichō contested visions of community with both court and clergy (i.e., there were no simple congruences of cosmology and community). I think that it is also historically verifiable that that charisma survived the routinization and was (and is) available as refigured community. In other words, the study of great men and women is as it should be, so long as the highly contingent nature of their greatness is not forgotten. This is particularly true if you don't agree with the “greatness” of the person in question—after all, dominant ideologies are a creation of the dominant, not the masses, and the analysis of ideology is intended to expose the workings of those who dominate (Green 1991).

The inadequacy of the Great/Little or elite/popular dualism has been convincingly demonstrated by many studies in the last fifteen or twenty years, particularly those dealing with folk traditions, peasant movements, and the like. Aspects of this model found wanting include the adversarial and disjunctive formulation of what is as often mutually influencing as contested, the polar structuring of multi-leveled and mobile societies and cultural formations, and, perhaps most seriously, the failure of such universal models of interpretation to fit the many and diverse peoples of the real world. Thus, in this case, the class structure of elite and popular, derived from Redfield's studies of peasant culture, are exported across the board to other cultures. More characteristic of the social sciences than the humanities, the endeavor betrays a certain flavor of the modernist (“scientific”) worldview, in which it is fancied that the enumeration of the objective facts of the surface structure certainly conform to a universal deep structure of cultures, the only difference being the grammar of transformation that rules their surface manifestation.

Of course McMullin understands well the importance of the powerful

11 McMullin's major work to date (1984), for example, depicts Oda Nobunaga, who surely qualifies as a "great man," as the pivot on which the momentous changes of the sixteenth century turned. The question is not whether Nobunaga was a singular great person who effected great changes (he was), nor whether the in-depth treatment accorded him is a significant contribution to the field (it is); the question is to what degree such an approach allows or denies the contingent and multivalent context (e.g., synchronically the attitudes of the other daimyō, the Buddhist institutions outside of the large militant groups—including their critics; diachronically, the Buddhist attitudes toward abō-buppō, the many other struggles that preceded Nobunaga, the continuing diversity and vitality of Buddhism under the Tokugawa, etc.).

12 In the field of Asian studies, much more work has been done in Chinese studies than Japanese, both with regards to peasant culture, popular religion, etc., and in such theoretical categories themselves. See Bell (1989) for a useful review of the field.

13 Such a dualistic view of power and conflict also contrasts with Kuroda's kenmon taisei (cited on p. 19).
few, as when he critiques the "tendency on the part of some scholars to take the Shinto of the ruling elite of premodern eras for Shinto in general, and to fail to recognize that the vast bulk of what we call Shinto was local cults that were concerned not with state legitimation myths and rituals but with fertility and disease" (p. 23), yet also claims that "the most important rituals were those that were performed for the well-being of the imperial house and the inner circle of ruling families" (p. 16), and "from the earliest days . . . the most important rituals were performed for the stability and protection of the state" (p. 11). Here, importance lies not in "bulk" but in the top-heavy status of the performers. Would we not therefore also have to hold that, by his own restricted definition of doctrine as the activity of the elite, it too is "important?"

The agenda thus cannot be simply to shift our attention from the elite to the popular, and it most definitely is not to attempt to identify which ideas, books, beliefs, practices, or institutions belonged to one or the other (e.g., assuming ideas to be uniquely appropriated by the elite), as the matrix of cultural discourse is as fluid as the participants are complex. We need rather to eliminate the distinction, or so refine it that it no longer conjures facile models of domination and privilege that in their misidentification become all the harder to assess. In spite of the refinements to the theory (usually in terms of $n$-dimensional arrays that permit more gradations than allowed by a simple binary opposition), it seems to me that in assuming any individual person to fit into a cultural matrix in a singular mode the contingent and multiple structures of the individual are violated in the same way that the more simplistic social models violate the integrity of aggregate cultures. Simply put, the complexity of the individual and society should be the focus of our studies rather than categories as fragmenting as they are artificial. As McMullin suggests, upon finding that elements of this complex are shared across boundaries (including his vertical axis of class), the interesting question becomes how the elements of culture function for different constituencies. This would allow for discussion of both differentiating and integrating aspects of cultural complexes. Concretely put, I would like to see studies of just how Shinran, Nichiren, and others understood the ritual and ideological aspects of their religious experience and doctrine, and how those who do not formulate doctrine understand and make possible the institutions of those that do—how are the various elements of cultural discourse appropriated by different constituencies, and how does this variation recursively make possible or inhibit those same elements? Why is the doctrine of excommunication acceptable to Shin followers? Why did Kurube feel that a return to the religious values of Shinran required radical organizational change at the parliamentary level (HUBBARD 1988b)?
Religion or Religions?

As noted above, a frequent corollary to the rejection of doctrinal differentiation is the assertion in its place of a unity or singularity. "In the minds of the pre-modern Japanese," McMullin writes, "Buddhist and Shinto views were thoroughly integrated. . . . Buddhism and Shinto were amalgamated institutionally, ritually, and doctrinally to such a degree that to treat them as distinct, independent traditions is to misrepresent the structure of pre-modern Japanese societies" (pp. 4–5). Nevertheless, fully cognizant of the dangers of the notion of a singular Japanese religion (Nihonkyō?), McMullin gives the integration a significant new twist in that, while he would eliminate "species-level" distinctions within Japanese religious traditions (in terms of doctrine, ritual, and institution) as well as "genus-level" distinctions (in terms of a "human event" that could be separated from, for example, a political event, as though "religion exists as a distinct, bounded object of knowledge," p. 24), he avers that there nonetheless remains incredible diversity along a "vertical axis of class divisions and urban-rural divisions" (pp. 24–25).

While heartily agreeing with the need to extend our research of Japanese religiosity into specific class, gender, ethnic, and other areas of difference, the means by which the horizontal differences are removed are important for that very goal. One approach we might call the "universalist" approach, i.e., if the category is large enough, the distinctions fade. Thus, in the largest context of human behavior we can make no distinctions between religious behavior and other human activities (p. 24); if that distinction is invalid, how much more so narrower divisions of species within the larger (invalidated) genus. In this view there is either a horizon of meaning so large ("human events") as to blur or eliminate boundaries and distinctions, or there is an underlying essence that unites in spite of superficial difference, although the two often merge (an underlying essence of faith is the thrust of the work by W. C. Smith that McMullin cites, p. 24). Such an analysis, however, moves just as clearly from the ahistorical genus to the historical species as that which McMullin opposes. Kuroda Toshio, for example, has amply illustrated the intertwining of Shinto and Buddhist institutions in many of his works, and is often cited by McMullin and others as the source for eliminating the distinction. Yet, interestingly, KURODA seems to have simply changed the terms of the argument: he claims that whereas earlier studies had considered Shinto an indigenous and autonomous force or "will of the people" that "transforms and assimilates diverse cultural elements imported from outside" (1981, p. 2; 1983, pp. 53–54), he now finds that "Up to just one hundred years ago, what constituted the religion and thought of the Japanese people in most periods of history was some-
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thing historical . . . something truly indigenous. In concrete terms, this was the *kenmitsu* Buddhist system including its components, such as Shinto and the Yin-yang tradition, and its various branches, both reformist and heretical. It, rather than Shinto, was the comprehensive, unified, and self-defined system of religious thought produced by Japan in pre-modern times. Even today it is perpetuated latently in everyday conventions as the subconscious of the Japanese people” (1981, p. 20; 1983, p. 77).

My worry is that this monolithic approach tends to emphasize the unity of the observer's methodological horizons at the expense of the historical contentiousness of those populating that horizon. Surely I feel that such is not McMullin’s purpose. Yet, we are told at the beginning of his essay, “examples in support of the points being made . . . could be drawn from any of the forms and branches of the Japanese religious traditions” (p. 4), and there is a disturbing tendency to universalize the claims of Indologists, sociologists, art historians, and other “authorities” to the Japanese case. While it is not necessarily true that the European art historian’s analysis is irrelevant to the Japanese case (no more than its mere citation makes it relevant or true), in combination with a theoretical elimination of genus and species level distinctions the overall effect is to warrant the universal at the expense of the particular, and the other is almost always lost in the universal, as parts become indistinct in the unity of the whole. This again plays perilously close to the *Nihonjinron* myth of the homogeneous nature of the Japanese spirit that underlies (honne) surface (tatemae) differences, and must accordingly be explicated very carefully. Though McMullin and others feel that the Shinto/Buddhist distinction is a modern concoction, to me it is not the sectarian spirit but rather the homogeneity of Japanese religious experience that is the product of the past century or so of state ideology.

We should also question the explanatory power of the unitary model if it cannot explain the sectarian spirit of Gyōnen’s *Hasshū kōyō* (p. 22), Kanaoka’s exclusion of Shinto shrines in his work on Buddhist temples (p. 23), or the contemporary understanding of Shinto as autonomous (p. 35).14 The evaluation of these as outside of or opposed to rather than as part of Japanese religiosity seems to indicate the weakness of the theory, and to methodologically oppose the 13th-century *Hasshū kōyō* with

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14 The real-world effect of sectarian differentiation is indicated in Grapard’s study of the Meiji implementation of shinbutsu-bunri (1984). According to his case study of Tonomine, its “cult was probably Buddhist to start with and nothing else” (p. 251), over time it “took on an increasingly ‘Shinto’ coloration” (p. 258), and “finally became ‘Shinto’ only in 1868” (p. 259), which change “was an abrupt disruption of the cultural discourse and the creation of a Shinto divinity that appears to be quite empty of religious character, for the simple but tough reason that it never was Shinto to start with.” (p. 262, emphasis added)
Kuroda's contemporary notion of kenmon taisei (p. 23, note 23) seems curious at best, particularly considering the alleged powerful influence of the former. At the metalevel of historiography, the question is not so much whether or not Gyanen's overview was accurate in a positivist historical sense, but rather how it forms a part of the cultural discourse of its time. And that (as so much else in Japanese history) betrays an intense interest in doctrinal differentiation. Although it is certainly true that the notion of “sectarian” changes with the Tokugawa and again with the modern period (particularly with regard to exclusive participation in a single tradition; see Ishida 1930, pp. 63-75; Dobrians 1991, p. 6; Stone 1991, pp. 21-29), and that cultic/institutional questions have not received their due attention, it is hard to swallow the idea that doctrinal differentiation was not important either in its own right or in relation to these other activities. Although we must evaluate the telos of contemporary scholarship, the analysis of post-Meiji understandings of Shinto and Buddhism as radically new often embeds the same developmental model, demanding that we see the contemporary discourse of Japanese religiosity as fundamentally different from the premodern, a projection of the modern myth of a self-created and epistemologically unique modernity. This evolutionary straitjacket entails as well the reification of “tradition.”

What I am recommending is another way to deconstruct the terms of our discussion: Buddhism and Shinto might be inappropriate or misleading terms, not because they imply a distinction where there is none, but rather because upon particular analysis these general terms fade in importance (just as does “human event”) or are seen to actually mask more important conflicts (as does the “mother of all whitewashes,” the Japanese notion of wa). In other words, instead of universalizing the terms of our discussion, I think it more important to particularize it. Allan Grapard, for example, while similarly denying the possibility of discussing Shinto and Buddhism other than as a “single body, the heart-mind” of “a historical, cultural discourse” (1984, pp. 241-43), nonetheless also rejects the paradigmatic approach (1990, pp. 73-75; 1988, p. 247). In its place he advances a particular or specific discussion of that body in which elements of ritual, institution, doctrine, and the terminology designating these elements can be “entirely Buddhist” (1984, p. 252) or “essentially Shinto” (p. 257), and the particularity of these elements not lost in the overall discourse of which it is part. In place of the monolith “Shinto” he proposes the specific, qualified structures of Ise Shinto and Miko Shinto (1988, p. 268) and a “combinatory” rather than syncretic model (1988, pp. 263 ff). The latter is especially helpful in understanding how plural and different aspects of doctrine, practice, and institution can come together, move apart, compete, and assign correspondences while yet retaining distinct cults, and legal, ecclesiastical, doctrinal, and
linguistic apparatuses. I believe that the same particularization of Buddhist elements would help us reclaim a coherence of cultural meaning far better than the universalist paradigm. The sectarian bias of religious discourse in Japan has a long history and splendid present—Gyōnen's work most clearly indicates it is not a product of this century (see also BIELEFELDT 1990). While the importance of paradigmatic coherence is not to be denied, the multivalency posited by McMullin is better illuminated through the fissures and cracks in the paradigm, including doctrinal dispute understood in its full historical context.

In this vein, for example, I would suggest that it is precisely the relating of honji and suijaku that indicates an awareness of difference, an awareness that is preserved as well in the continued separation of legal codes, terms of ecclesiastic rank, and ritual function even within the often-overlapping duties and posts of the players themselves (TYLER 1989, pp. 243–46). The speed and thoroughness of the ideological campaign for a “pure and indigenous Shinto” (shinbutsu bunri) also bespeaks more the continued cultural differentiation than the lack thereof. The individual building blocks used in the construction of systemic cultural discourse cannot be lost without simultaneously losing the ability to say anything at all about that discourse. It is not to be wondered that most who would privilege the unity of the discourse end up with a thoroughly relativist view of its constituents, precluding social or any other form of criticism. Thus, while I support McMullin's argument for attention to hitherto ignored areas of difference, I hold that the differences he wishes to eliminate are a) as real as the relationships he and others depict (i.e., evidenced in the historical record in terms of doctrine, cultus, ecclesiastical structure, legal codes, etc.) and b) essential if we are to avoid a paralyzing form of relativism.

Functionalism

A final area in which I feel greater caution is called for is McMullin's general endorsement of the “functional” definition of religion (pp. 8–10, 25–27). Related no doubt to the consequentialist view of cognitive and propositional belief structures as well as his overall goal of restoring the social/political context of Japanese religiosity, the functional analysis has long dominated the approach of the social sciences to religious studies (the early social functionalism of Malinowski and psychological functionalism of Radcliffe-Browne continues to exert tremendous influence in spite of significant critique). Although McMullin is careful theoretically to include the possibility of mutual influence (“doctrines developed almost invariably in response to, or at least in symbiotic conjunction with, developments in other sectors of the society . . .”) p. 8; “[honji-suijaku] theories . . . often developed in response to or together with
developments in the economic realm . . .” p. 10), he readily admits to seeing religious structures more as effects than causes of social and economic structures (p. 27; 1989b, p. 89).

In fact, it seems to me that his historiography logically precludes any real sense of mutual influence. It is therefore not to be wondered that in spite of admitting the theoretical possibility of religious structures influencing economic and political change, his own work focuses rather exclusively on these structures as the dependent variable in social change and tends towards a unilateral and univalent model of causality. Thus, too, he has difficulty accommodating religious activity as an active causal force in historical development and contradicts his own claim of not reducing religious structures to mere reflections of economic and social structures (p. 27), when he tells us that “developments in the religious world must be understood in terms of the ways in which they reflected and addressed developments in the societies of the times in which those developments took place” (p. 25, emphases added).

If the hegemony of canonical interpretation within Japanese history is in fact that which McMullin ascribes to “religious belief” and “classical religious notions” (as well as the hegemony which he ascribes to the weight of a “canonical” interpretation within the study of Japanese religion [1989a, b, c, d, esp. 1989c, pp. 246–50]), it seems rather ineffective to dismiss the instrumental agency of that canon rather than critique it. A naive Weberian analysis might put more emphasis on religious tradition as the independent variable (preexisting value systems effect, in a direct and positive way, social, economic, and cultural change), but my point is not to advocate a historically positivist attempt to nail down all of the causes and conditions of a given historical event (futile in any case). Rather, I would suggest that, inasmuch as doctrinal systems themselves make explicit the embedded social and institutional value systems, we need to examine closely the way in which the individuals participating in these systems understand and adapt them, and how they are fit (often in a Procrustean-bed fashion) to the ultimate understandings and original charisma of the tradition. There I think we find that, just as the charisma of inspired leaders (in Japanese religious history, often great women) transfigures the signs and structures of authority (especially potent as a challenge to local ideologies), the subsequent institutions refigure those same structures within the grammar of convention. It is the dynamic between the charisma and the acculturated (routinized) that give religious institutions their incredible ideological power, a power that is easily seen to be more attractive, powerful, and resilient than the various state and social ideologies with which they occasionally contest. Hence, too, they outlast these same ideologies. If this dynamism is perhaps the positive enabling of religious tradition, we must also remember that religious traditions do not, in fact, always vie within the
same realm as the state, merchants, and other interested parties. Indeed, the fact that coercive authority often overlooks doctrine, ritual, and institutions that rhetorically threaten their ideological hegemony cautions us against an overly simplistic assumption that, for example, doctrine is always ideological, or perceived as ideologically threatening. As McMullin correctly notes, the "one-ness" of religious and political rhetoric is another construct that needs more refinement before it can be accepted in toto (p. 15, n. 13).

This fact of "staying power" deserves attention in any discussion of instrumental agency. For example, how is it that the religious/political doctrine of one time and place is able to validate the social/historical person of another age? Why is mappō able to resonate so deeply in times of plenty as well as times of deprivation? Like the crisis theory so popular in the kind of functional reductionism applied to new religious movements (used to explain both the appearance of the new movements in general as well as individual interest), the explanation of response to social upheaval is simply not adequate (HARDACRE 1984; WILSON 1990, esp. pp. 193 ff.), as the movement is seen to outlive the decisive period of its birth just as the individual continues on after the personal crisis that sparks his or her faith. The question is not whether doctrine, institution, and ritual are influenced by history (clearly they are, and just as clearly influence history), but precisely how they refigure that particularity in such a way that it resonates ultimately for those who believe it as well as proximately for purposes of maintaining and enhancing power structures. It seems to me that this answer is of greater import for the critical evaluation of religious history than an attempt at unfolding infinitely possible chains of causal determinism.

The type of analysis that assumes that religious phenomena are born from, and react solely to, social and historical situations entails a theory regarding the nature and validity of religious experience that, if not unwarranted from the beginning, at least demands a more thoroughgoing and theoretical presentation than is usually found in the functional descriptions of social phenomena. To say, with Marx, that our consciousness is led by our social nexus and material wants is not necessarily to say that all consciousness is solely contrived by that nexus, but rather that it cannot be understood shorn of it (GREEN 1991). As much as the dismissal of magic and ritual that McMullin rightly decries, the secular

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15 My own work on the economic institutions and official suppressions of the San-chieh-chiao in Sui-T'ang China, for example, convinces me that more mundane, realepolitik issues were at issue than fine points of Buddhist doctrine, however ideologically nuanced they were (HUBBARD 1988b).

16 Obviously I am also bracketing entirely the question of the truth-value of religious claims.
reduction of functionalism is very much a product of the Enlightenment and other Western models; that the real world consistently refuses to be so reduced bespeaks the bias of the enterprise. The indignity shown our theories of modernization by the continued dynamism of religious organization in Japan (and, indeed, most of the world) indicates that, rather than mistrust the enchanted or sacred view of religious expressions (1989b, p. 85), we should in fact be more wary of the disenchantment assumed in theories of rationalization or functionalism. In order to break free of the strictures of simple social functionalism, however, it is not necessary to go so far as to claim "pure, ahistoric, consciousness" as the source of religious behavior, although perhaps many who question the notion of "only mediated experience" would wish to do so. It is rather to ultimately construe meaning and its causal matrix as individually created as much as socially mediated, complexly holographic and contingent as much as simply linear in causal structure, and existentially free as much as historically bound. It is, after all, only in this mode that we can avoid the coherence imputed to traditional societies by those who would avoid signs of cultural stress, fracture, and disjunction as a projection of their own modern rationalism. Thus, for example, I would suggest that the Buddhist doctrine of suffering, while sharing many formal analytical structures with the socio-functional notion of crisis, is in fact a superior descriptive category (i.e., fits better the practitioners' stated understanding) and analytic tool (allows precisely for refigured charisma to persistently signify the everyday in terms of ultimate ends).17

_Academia and the Study of Japanese Religion_

Finally, I should be remiss if I did not say that I found much of his discussion of how Japanese religions are presented (the grist for his historiographical mill) somewhat puzzling, at least with regard to the doctrine-only approach that he finds so problematic.18 Although he

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17 In a similar vein, Richard Fox _Young_ (1990) has argued, for example, that the popularity of the "occult" in contemporary Japan against all odds of modernization theory is not "an archaic cognitive anomaly" but rather "an expanded rationality with its own modality of logic" (p. 29). The pseudo-science logic of cause and effect he finds behind Mahikari spirit possession is, in the end, no different from the pseudo-science of Buddhist _pratityasamutpada_; I submit that such propositional claims of believers have far more explanatory value than the (equally propositional) model of functional response.

18 For a better understanding of the target of McMullin's methodological critique see _McMullin_ (1989b and c); that the "Chicago School" (and all who follow their lead, which is seemingly the entire field) is largely the focus of this article as well is borne out in _McMullin_ 1989d, which, while specifically addressing Kitagawa's work, largely reproduces the arguments presented in the article considered here. Inasmuch as my own training in Buddhist studies was largely textual and largely ignored the work of "religionists," I do not feel the
speaks as though nobody discusses the factors of taxation and mobility involved in Mt. Hiei's growth (p. 9), the sacerdotal nature of uji no kami and early "commingling of 'political and religious'" (p. 13), or the political climate of Shinran's teachings (p. 25), etc., I find this hard to accept—I would have to go quite a ways back to find the hasshū kōyō-dominated studies that he describes. Takakusu's *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, of course, comes to mind, but surely it has been a long time since that served students as other than a handy crib for reading Gyōnen's work. Matsunaga's *Foundations of Japanese Buddhism*, probably the standard English-language text for undergraduates, prominently discusses the political ramifications of the early state adoption of Buddhism, the 17-article constitution, Emperor Shōmu's construction of the *daibutsu*, and Saichō's petitions, as well as the artificial nature of the "six schools," Tendai nationalism, the power-brokering of the monastery-shrine complexes, the political, social and economic tenor of Shinran's movement, etc. Even August Karl Reischauer, writing from his post in Philosophy and Systematic Theology at Meiji Gakuin in 1913, notes that "the successful entrance of a religion into a country depends more or less upon the religious, social, political, and intellectual condition," (Reischauer 1913, p. 82) and "The influence of Buddhism during the Nara period . . . extended perhaps even more into the field of politics and state affairs" (1913, p. 89), etc. In other words, the various political contexts of Japanese religions have oft been adumbrated, of course with more or less accuracy and detail. The problem is not whether the military power of Mt. Hiei is mentioned (it virtually always is), but rather to convey just how the possession of that military power was seen as consonant with religious belief and practice. It is only then that we can approach a position from which the appraisal of that same worldview can proceed.

The same is true of Japanese scholarship—though there are of course many Japanese scholars pursuing the textual approach to religious studies inherited from a European classics tradition and a great many theologically or sectarian oriented scholars, there are also a large number who take a social, economic, and political approach to their studies. Usually, however, as in the West, they are found in the history and social science departments. Unfortunately, the historian is not often sufficiently
interested in the charismatic and doctrinal aspects of the traditions whose history they treat to deal with them adequately, as is the case with the social science approach so dominant in the study of new religious movements in Japan alluded to at the beginning of this paper. While I share his feeling that the full import of the current self-reflective mood has yet to have an adequate impact on the academic study of religion, I do not share his concern that the “ahistorical psyche” has received exclusive interest at the expense of the “historical physic.” We could, in fact, equally take historians and social scientists (easily the dominant fields in Japanese studies) to task for ignoring the psyche, and ask them to retool in the “religionist” mode. I prefer the diversity.

Conclusion

Let me again stress that, for the most part, I am in full accord with McMullin’s basic agenda (restoring the social context of religious traditions, paying more attention to our own stake in our scholarship, opening ourselves to the ritual and institutional aspects of Japanese traditions, etc.); rather, my concern is that the result of eliminating or downplaying the importance of doctrine will be to undermine that same agenda. On the other hand, appreciating religious doctrine allows the fully nuanced understanding of both the cultural or political context McMullins seeks (the religious notions that he sees of paramount importance in historical development), and the individual appropriation and cultivation of charisma within that context that I take to be the more enduring and interesting feature of religious history. It further eliminates many theoretical and empirical inconsistencies.

These difficulties and inconsistencies indicate, I believe, that we should take the attempt to stake out a historiographic claim as more prolegomena than finished product and as more bespeaking the difficulty of the task than as presenting a resolution of these difficulties (his conclusion does, in fact, recognize the preparatory state of the endeavour). Given the admittedly preliminary state of the discussion, none of my criticisms are, in themselves, overly problematic, except insofar as the puzzles of his presentation seriously weaken a much-needed appeal for more attention to the institutional and cultic aspects of Japanese religion. However, I fear that, taken together with some of his more untenable methodological points, his essay also has the unsavory result of thoroughly undermining the possibility of criticism—social, political, and especially doctrinal criticism—that I feel to be the only possible goal, though not necessarily the constant practice, of scholarship once the political nature of one’s own research and writing is discovered.

If premodern historiography was naive in its enchantment with the nonhistorical and noncritical, modern historiography has been naive in
both its optimistic hope of capturing the objective facts of the world "out there" and, significantly, in its lack of reflexive appreciation of its own participatory stance. Although McMullin seems to share this positivist notion of the scholar's task (pp. 31, 32) at the same time he questions its possibility (p. 24; 1989b, p. 91, 1989c, p. 247), he definitely wants to push us beyond the latter naiveté. We are thus allowed to ask, I believe, exactly what are we to do with his ideology? Although much of his article is strongly (and laudably) informed by an activist approach to the ideological freight of modern scholarship, and though perhaps we may be able to infer some of McMullin's politics, it yet does not give a sense of the reflexivity so characteristic of the postmodern rejection of the hegemonic claims of modern ideologies, the stricture of the "ism." Contra Marx, ideologies no longer conceal only the interests of the ruling class. Any critique of ideological bias is necessarily self-referential, turning back on itself, emptying and designifying as it goes. How then do we understand his ideology? How do we accept the ponderous closure of his judgment of the skewed bias of scholarly reporting in a post-everything, death-of-everything world dominated by a relativist approach to all ideology, including one's own? I fear that the result is simply to render his position typically modern in much the same way as that which he assails, and thus merely one of many ideologies contending for supremacy. It forms an interesting and readily identifiable part of the intellectual landscape of the times, but not a compelling argument for change. To therefore disregard it, however, leads to the debilitating ideology of Religious Studies that I would critique: the self-assuring complacency, the noncritical tolerance fostered by the current mood of the postmodern "collage," the paralysis of the merely relative pawned off as celebration of a pluralist diversity. McMullin's readiness to kick-start the movement towards critical methodological awareness is exemplary, and, if I prefer to engage rather than ignore him, it is because I expect that he believes he is expressing ideas both true and "important." Having begun, we can now move forward, for it is only after one's own ideological bias is deconstructed that one can advance beyond the pastiche of the postmodern and again engage in the task of social criticism. In terms of religious institutions, that critique is best engaged within the paradigm of the ideology itself, the normative critique of religious doctrine. Lest my position be misunderstood, this means, at least with regard to our methodological ruminations, a move such as McMullin himself has made: a move to the highly prescriptive realm of philosophy, theology, ethics, and even apologetics, based on the best possible descriptive studies.  

19 There can be no question, for example, that the social critiques of Buddhist doctrine leveled lately by Noriaki Hakamaya have caused a great stir in Japan, broadening out to influence feminist criticism, discussion of the religious base of racism in Japanese society, etc.
This also means that the theoretical must be argued for, not simply presented via agamana.

The rich and wide-ranging scope of McMullin’s comments offers much food for thought—indeed, a veritable feast—and if in my comments it appears that I have only presented what was hard to digest among many substantial and nourishing dishes, it is not because of my gourmet tastes so much as my concern that others will turn away from the banquet. Thus I offer my remarks as suggestions for fine-tuning the enterprise, and in appreciation for McMullin having again forcefully raised the issue.

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