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A Concept of “Overseas Shinto Shrines”
A Pantheistic Attempt by Ogasawara Shōzō and Its Limitations

“Overseas Shinto shrines” (kaigai jinja) is a generic term that refers not only to colonial shrines within the former Japanese empire, but also to shrines built in countries other than Japan by Japanese emigrants. This article examines the thought and activities of Ogasawara Shōzō (1892–1970), who coined this term and devoted himself to the establishment of institutions for Shinto shrines overseas before Japan’s defeat in World War II. Beginning with an overview of the conventional State Shinto concept, including the historical facts concerning colonial shrines, it traces Ogasawara’s Shinto education, his encounter with ethnic Korean issues in the Japanese empire, and his enthusiasm to make shrine Shinto a universal (world) religion. Through analyses of the successes and failures of his attempts, this article reveals the potential of Shinto as a polytheistic religion and also its limitations with regard to modern Japanese expansionism.

KEYWORDS: Ogasawara Shōzō—overseas shrines—Amaterasu—Chōsen Shrine Issue—Kunitama—Japanese colonialism

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Before Japan’s defeat in World War II in 1945, two popular Japanese terms were naichi 内地 (the inner land, meaning the “Japanese mainland”), and gaichi 外地 (the outer lands, meaning “Japanese frontiers”). Naichi referred to the territory of Japan at the start of the Meiji Period. In contrast, gaichi referred to all other territories acquired after 1868, with the exception of some intermediate areas (such as Hokkaido, Ryukyu [Okinawa], and the Bonin Islands). Japan incorporated Taiwan as a result of the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895); Karafuto (the southern half of Sakhalin); the Kwantung Leased Territory (on the Liaotung peninsula) with the South Manchuria Railway Zone in 1905 as a result of the Russo-Japanese War; annexed Korea in 1910; and received the South Sea islands (Nan’yō 南洋) in Micronesia as a League of Nations mandate in 1920. After a half century of expansion, the Japanese empire forfeited all of its overseas territories, with its multi-ethnic political sphere in East Asia. When this empire was demolished, more than six hundred Shinto shrines and over one thousand tiny shrines that were recognized as candidates to become regular shrines stood within the frontiers. Usually the generic term kaigai jinja 海外神社 (overseas Shinto shrines) was applied to not only those shrines in the frontier, but also to shrines within Japanese settlements in foreign countries. Many of them were terminated with the collapse of the empire. A few in Hawai’i and Brazil have survived until this day (Inoue 1985; Maeyama 1997; Maeda 1999; Shoji 2008), and in a few rare cases, shrines were established in the post-war period (Ishida 2008).

This article examines the thought and activities of Ogasawara Shōzō 小笠原省三 (1892–1970) who coined the term “overseas shrines.” Recent Japanese scholarship sometimes refers to those shrines in the frontiers as “colonial shrines” (shoku-minchi jinja 植民地神社). We must, however, notice the conceptual difference between “overseas shrines” and “colonial shrines.” Of course, the latter supposes a historical similarity between Western colonialism and Japanese colonialism. This comparison has the advantage of regarding the Japanese case as a variation of the general expansionism of nation-states. But we should not overlook the fact

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1. In some later cases, Manchukuo 満洲国, established in 1932, was often understood as a part of gaichi. On Manchuria’s relations with modern Japan and Manchukuo history, see Young 1998, and Duara 2003. On Shinto shrines in Manchukuo, see Sagai 1998.

2. The first book to employ the term kaigai jinja as a part of its title was Kondō 1943.

3. On the history of overseas shrines’ architecture and their locations from this viewpoint, see Aoi 2005.
that the Japanese empire developed with a self-critical ambivalence between two opposite poles: identifying itself with—and differentiating itself from—Western colonialism (Tanaka 1993). In this article I consider one aspect of this ambivalence in Japanese expansionism through Ogasawara’s thought and activities regarding “overseas shrines.” I will do this from the viewpoint of religious studies, as I believe Ogasawara’s Shinto faith is well worth considering as a case study on the relationship between modern nationalism and religion.

**The State Shinto Concept and Overseas Shrines**

“State Shinto exerted a deep and wide influence not only on religions but throughout people’s lives and consciousness for about eighty years.” So asserts Murakami Shigeyoshi at the beginning of his *Kokka Shintō* (1970, 1). In this book Murakami claims that a series of wars conducted by Japan between 1931 and 1945—namely the Manchurian Incident (1931–1932), the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), and the Pacific War (1941–1945)—was the “phase of State Shinto’s accomplishment as a fascist-like state religion.” In a section titled “Shrines in the Colonies” (*Shokuminchi no jinja* 植民地の神社), he alleges that during this phase many shrines dedicated mainly to Amaterasu Ōmikami 天照大神 (hereafter “Amaterasu”), the sun goddess who, as the imperial ancestor, functions as the representative deity among the Celestial Deities (*amatsu kami* 天神) in the Shinto pantheon, were built all over East Asia as a result of State Shinto’s policy of expansion (Murakami 1970, 192–95). In other words, he asserts that overseas shrines generally embodied the aggressive nature of State Shinto itself.4

Basically, Murakami’s concept of “State Shinto” followed what was defined in and banned by the Shinto Directive (*Shintō shirei* 神道指令) in 1945. This directive provided the official notification of the allied powers’ occupation policy towards religion after Japan’s defeat. It prohibited state administration of and support for Shinto shrines as “non-religious” entities, a policy it viewed as the root of Japanese “militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology.”5 Even though the conceptual ambiguity of “State Shinto,” where the ideological and institutional aspects have been intermingled, has been gradually acknowledged in Japanese scholarship (Ashizu 1987; Hardacre 1989; Sakamoto 1994; Nitta 1997; Shimazono 2001 and 2009),6 Murakami’s view on overseas shrines is still influential today, although this view did not originate with him. Supplementing some historical incidents depicted

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4. ZUSHI Minoru (2003) coined the term *shinryaku jinja* 侵略神社 (invader shrines) as an alternative generic term for the overseas shrines.

5. This phrase is common in the Shinto Directive.

6. On the author’s opinions about Shimazono’s recent important works concerning State Shinto, see Shimazono, Yamaguchi, Suga, and Takeda 2008.
in Ogasawara’s book *Kaigaijinjashi* (1953), his opinion was a sketchy digest of Daniel C. Holtom’s “The Overseas Expansion of State Shinto,” which was one chapter in *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism* (1947, 153–73). This book was translated into Japanese in 1950 with a supplement, but its original version was published in 1943 in the United States. Of course, this and other works by Holtom decisively influenced the creation of the Shinto Directive (Ôhara 1993, 9, 13, 325–28).

During World War II Holtom had already indicated some facts about overseas shrines that would later become received wisdom for historians. In his writings he addressed the ideological background of the overseas expansion of State Shinto, the harshness of cultural assimilation policies in Taiwan and Korea, the conflicts between Christian missionaries and the colonial authority in Korea, and the enshrining of Amaterasu in the Foundation Deity’s Shrine (Kenkokushinbyō 建国神廟) in Manchukuo, and so on. Holtom asserts, “The authorities are interested in Shinto for a crusade, one that is economic, political, and strategic. Shinto is a tool for the consummation of state policy” (1947, 167). Furthermore, he referred to a local official’s statement in 1936, “when the storm over the shrines was breaking in Korea” on school education: “Such things as the advocacy of the individualistic and arbitrary interpretation that the shrines are religious in nature and in particular the opposition to orders concerning administration are not to be permitted” (1947, 167).

The confrontation of Christians in Korea with so-called “compulsory shrine worship” is a popular topic today among Korean and Japanese Christians, including legendary episodes of martyrdoms (Morioka and Kasaoka 1974, 47; Suga 2004a, 23–31). The large number of letters sent at the time from American missionaries in Korea to their headquarters report on the “shrine problem”—these primarily concern the schools they ran, but also attest to the seriousness of their difficulty.7 I think, however, this problem originally concerned the taboo against idolatry within Christian creeds in general rather than the particular conflict between Korean nationalism and Japanese imperialism. Therefore, given the hardships of these Christians, it is understandable that the colonial government became more intolerant of the shrine administration in Korea after 1936. Also, it is significant that this case in 1936 is the earliest instance of conflicts concerning colonial shrines that Holtom cites. This means that Holtom, who was surely the foremost American observer of Shinto at that time, could not find a good example of “Shinto, as a crusade” before the mid-1930s.

7. The Presbyterian Historical Society in Philadelphia, PA, preserves many such letters and documents. Generally these statements report that the Japanese authorities began to place more emphasis upon the shrine ceremonies in 1935, and came to insist on mass shrine visits, particularly by school children, after 1936.
Holtom also mentions cases in colonial Taiwan: “The Japanese policy of cultural assimilation in Formosa includes … the interdiction of the worship of Chinese idols, accompanied by rigid requirements for participation in Shinto ceremonies and the erection of Shinto god-shelves in the home. The nationalization of Korea follows the same pattern of inner penetration” (1947, 164). He does not mention, however, the preceding colonial policy for Taiwanese culture known as “native custom conservation” (kyūkan hozon 旧慣保存), which had been maintained for almost four decades but also officially ceased in 1936. What happened in 1936? In 1935, the Japanese government proclaimed the “Clarification of the National Polity” (kokutai meichō 国体明徴). This official fundamentalist interpretation of the imperial sovereign demonstrated an obsession within the society of Japan’s inner lands as it faced international tensions. The drastic change of the colonial shrine policies the next year was an effect of this proclamation’s extensive application to the whole empire. Therefore, this assimilation movement, including “compulsory shrine worship” was given a special term: the “Imperialization of subject peoples” (kōminka 皇民化). In any case, a historical watershed in the connection between Shrine Shinto and national mobilization occurred in the mid-1930s.8

In 1933, the year following the “independence” of Manchukuo, Ogasawara published Kaigai no Jinja, the first book focusing on shrines outside of the inner lands of Japan and the first to use the term “overseas shrines.” As if predicting the loathsome future of overseas shrines, Ogasawara included a warning in this book:

Any “object” which is alienated from peoples’ actual lives will lose its *raison d’etre*. Shinto shrines are “sites for the performance of the state ritual” [kokka no sōshi 国家の宗祀] of course, but forcibly maintaining entities alienated from peoples’ actual lives through state power would make shrines lose their religious nature and make them something like a kind of monument. If this principle were to be disregarded, any shrine, not just the Chōsen Jingū but also others in Korea and Manchuria, and even shrines in the mainland, would gradually come to lose their ties with people’s individual lives, social lives, and national lives in the future. We should keep this firmly in mind.

(Ogasawara 1933a, 192)

The Chōsen Jingū 朝鮮神宮 or Chōsen Shrine was the name given to the highest ranking shrine in Korea after 1925. In fact, a controversy about this shrine triggered Ogasawara’s concern for overseas shrines.

8. The persecution of Chinese-style worship in Taiwan was terminated in October 1941, just two months before the Pearl Harbor attack. Interestingly, the negative propaganda about these cases in Taiwan generated by Britain and the United States seems to have ended the persecution under the shadow of a coming war. Holtom might echo this propaganda. See MiYAMOTO 1988, 57–8; Tsai 1994, 286; and SUGA 2004a, 318–22.
We will first survey the history of the overseas shrines before the establishment of the Chōsen Shrine. At the time of the Meiji Restoration, the only shrine outside of Japanese territory existed in the Japanese residential area near Pusan, the only Korean port open to Japan in the early modern period. During the 1880s two shrines were established in Korean ports. Following the first Sino-Japanese War, evangelists of Jingūkyō 神宮教, one of the sects of Shinto, were active in Korea and Taiwan. Their frontier missions often took place together with other Shinto sects and competed with Japanese Buddhists and Christians. As I will explain below, the management of Shinto frontier missions changed after the second decade of the twentieth century. Generally speaking, however, from the 1880s up to the first half of the 1930s, most overseas shrines were built and managed voluntarily by Japanese emigrants, either under the direction of Shinto missionaries or as transplants of cults from the emigrants’ home regions (Ogasawara 1953, 45–56; Suga 2004a, 261–91; and Tairiku Shintō Renmei 2005, 39–52, 207–17, 282–90). This might explain why Holtom could not find a good example of “Shinto, as a crusade” during this period.

It may be worthwhile to briefly describe Jingūkyō here, differentiating it from other Shinto sects. As a result of the state’s prohibition on the involvement of “non-religious” Shinto shrine priests with “religious” evangelical activities, Jingūkyō was established in 1882 as one of the religious Shinto sects. It was organized around the confraternities formerly attached to “Jingū” or the Grand Shrines of Ise (so-called Ise Jingū 伊勢神宮). Historically, Jingū has been ranked alone above all other ordinary shrines because the imperial ancestor, the sun goddess Amaterasu, is officially enshrined there. In order to preserve the sole supremacy of Jingū, the evangelists of Jingūkyō wanted to establish outposts of Jingū as “places to worship from afar” (yōhaisho 遙拝所). But because of this direct connection to the imperial ancestral deity, the existence of Jingūkyō as one of the religious sects came to be criticized as an appropriation of public national values. Therefore, Jingūkyō reorganized itself into a non-religious and non-governmental foundation, the Jingū-hōsaikai 神宮奉斎会 (Association of Devotees of Jingū) in 1899 (Okada 1960, 95–117; Kubota 1966; Inoue 1991, 25–39; and Suga 2004a, 277–80). The Jingū-hōsaikai still promoted overseas missions for a while, but it withdrew following a series of state administration rearrangements concerning Shinto and religious affairs around the first half of the second decade of the twentieth century (Sakamoto 2000). Later, Ogasawara evaluated this institutional reformation figuratively: “as the legislation of the shrine system took place one by one, and the shrine priesthood turned into a part of the bureaucracy, their former religious enthusiasm cooled and their

9. For this reason Jingūkyō has not been counted among “the thirteen Shinto sects” established during the Meiji period.
vocation at the shrines came to be a part of the state administration until the end of World War II” (Ogasawara 1953, 55). In any case, the development of the Amaterasu faith in the frontiers was in this fashion more complicated than what Murakami’s conclusion would suggest. Together with other unofficial shrines, the outposts of Jingū in the colonies legally became regular shrines in the 1920s. Religions came under legislative regulation in the Japanese colonies during this period. At least in terms of cultural policies involving the shrines, prior to the emergence of the total war regime covering the whole empire in 1937, each frontier was redefined as a locality within the empire. Still within the range of the home government’s principle of treating “Shinto shrines as non-religious,” each colonial government adopted different policies in terms of how Shinto shrines related to other religions (Tsai 1994; Suga 2004a, 85–8, 299–309).10

On the other hand, as an exception to this, there was a group of large shrines founded by the direct policy of the home government. As a customary practice since Hokkaido was incorporated at the beginning of the Meiji period, the home government established one state shrine to be ranked highest in each colony. Those shrines were known as Sō Chinju 総鎮守, and were dedicated to the general guardian deities in each region. They were: Sapporo Shrine (Sapporo Jinja 札幌神社 in Hokkaido, established in 1871, the only surviving Sō Chinju in frontiers following World War II, renamed Hokkaidō Jingū 北海道神宮 in 1964); Taiwan Shrine (Taiwan Jinja 台湾神社 in Taiwan, established in 1901); Karafuto Shrine (Karafuto Jinja 樺太神社 in south Sakhalin, established in 1911); Chōsen Shrine (in Korea, established in 1925); South Seas Shrine (Nan’yō Jinja 南洋神社 in Micronesia, established in 1940); and Kwantung Shrine (Kwantō Jingū 関東神宮 in Kwantung territory, established in 1944). Among them, the Chōsen Shrine was surely the turning point in the history of overseas shrines in terms of which deities would be enshrined. It was also a turning point in Ogasawara’s thought regarding Shinto.

The Chōsen Shrine Issue

Amaterasu and Emperor Meiji were enshrined in the Chōsen Shrine in Seoul (called Keijō 京城 at that time in Japanese). All prior Sō Chinju shrines had enshrined the same set of three deities, the so-called kaitaku-sanshin 開拓三神: namely Ōnamuchi-no-kami 大己貴神, Sukunahikona-no-kami 少彦名神, and Ōkunitama-no-kami 大國魂神 (literally the “deity of the great land soul”). They were selected from the group of “terrestrial deities” (kunitsu-kami 地祇) in Japanese classical mythology and invoked to serve as the guardians of pioneering

10. For example, in Taiwan the administration of shrines was never separated completely from other religions.
(kaitaku 開拓) in each region. Thus, Chōsen Shrine was the first case of Amaterasu being enshrined in a Sō Chinju. It should be pointed out, however, that this case proved the unique character of Korea within the empire in terms of its historical and cultural relationship with Japan, rather than an ideological change within State Shinto.

The plan to establish a shrine in order to represent the fraternity between Japanese and Korean people dated back to before the Korean annexation (SUGA 2004a, 51–78). In 1906, the National Association for Shrine Priests (Zenkoku shinshokukai 全国神職会, organized in 1898) petitioned the first Resident-General of Korea, Itō Hirobumi 伊藤博文, for permission to establish the shrine. In this petition, Shintoists already included the name of Dangun (Tangun 檀君), the mythological founder of the ancient Korean nation, as a deity to represent Korean ethnicity, much as Amaterasu represented the Japanese. They proposed consecrating these two deities together. Originally their interest in Dangun came from Tsunoda Tadayuki 角田忠行, an elder priest who had belonged to the Hirata sect of Kokugaku (National Learning School) before the Meiji Restoration.

Tsunoda identified Dangun with Susano-o-no-mikoto 素戔嗚尊 (a younger brother of Amaterasu in Japanese myths) in light of the supposed mythological relations between Korea and Japan in antiquity. This was also a compromise between the Hirata school’s ethnocentric Shinto ideal—“Japan as the origin of the world”—and the latest theory concerning “the identical origins of Japanese and Koreans” advocated by some historians and anthropologists. Further, Tsunoda’s interest in Dangun coincided with the emergence of a Korean nationalism focused on this deity. Thus the Shintoists’ petition reverberated beyond their original intent; when the Japanese government faced the March First Independent Movement of 1919 in Korea, Tsunoda’s opinion concerning Dangun was quoted by a group of liberal Diet members to accuse the colonial government of misrule. Then, around the time of the inauguration ceremony of the Chōsen Shrine on 15 October 1925, several Shinto activists, including leading figures in the priesthood, petitioned the Governor-General to enshrine Dangun in it. The Governor-General, however, did not accept their petition (ASHIKABIKAI 1939, 100; OGASAWARA 1953, 57–80; TEZUKA 1953; and SUGA 2004a, 111–57). This time their petition did not represent the opinion of the general priesthood in the National Association for Shrine Priests, allowing Shinto activists outside of this association, such as Ogasawara, to be involved.

Ogasawara Shōzō was born on 14 September 1892, the fourth son of a hereditary Shinto priest family at a small shrine in the Tsugaru region of Aomori prefecture. The fact that his home village was in the northern periphery of the Japanese mainland is important for understanding his thought. Although he graduated from the Shinto priest seminary course at Kokugakuin University 國學院大學 in Tokyo in 1912, he intended to become a writer and was not appointed
to any particular shrine as a priest. He came of age during the period when, as he described it, “the shrine priesthood turned into a part of the bureaucracy” (1953, 55). After 1916, he published several books in succession about Japanese mythology and history. Haga Yaichi 芳賀矢一, the representative scholar of Japanese literature and intellectual history at the time, provided glowing forewords to many of the books. Ogasawara also published a book about Japanese folk tales together with Takagi Toshio 高木敏雄, who is today regarded as the premier Japanese scholar of mythology.11 These early works indicate that Ogasawara was a cultured person with enough knowledge about Japanese classics and history to interpret them in his unique way, distinct from the orthodox interpretations put forward by the shrine priesthood or the state administrators (Ogasawara 1916, 1919, and 1923; Takagi and Ogasawara 1917).

At the time of the debate about the Chōsen Shrine, however, Ogasawara occupied a slightly odd position when compared with a few years before: he was the chief secretary of the Japanese right-wing group, the Band for Preventing the Red Trend (Sekika Bōshidan 赤化防止団). His activities had come under surveillance by both the political police and the military police, and were sometimes reported in the newspapers. It is not known when and why he came to occupy this position. This Band itself was organized by a lawyer in 1922 as a direct counter-movement against communism and anarchism following the Russian Revolution, but it had disintegrated by the end of the 1920s (Kōan Chōsachō 1964, 551–53).

On 27 December 1923 in Tokyo, Ogasawara and others promoted a Shinto ceremony to be called Kantō Daishinzai sōnan Chōsenjin ireisai 関東大震災遭難朝鮮人慰霊祭 (Memorial service for the Korean victims of the great Kantō earthquake). The earthquake occurred on 1 September, killing about 105,000 people in Tokyo and surrounding areas. In its aftermath, an estimated several thousand innocent ethnic Koreans were slaughtered by Japanese mobs inflamed by groundless rumors of Korean sabotage. Ogasawara was prompted to organize the ceremony because of the shame he felt as a Japanese person for this massacre (Ogasawara 1953, 69–78).

In the discussions following this ceremony, Ogasawara reports that he came to feel sincere fraternity and sympathy towards the Koreans. Actually, the ceremony was held on the same day as the Toranomon Incident 虎ノ門事件, an attempted assassination of the then Prince Regent, Hirohito (later Emperor Showa), by a maverick Japanese communist named Namba Daisuke 難波大助. In light of Ogasawara’s concern with both anti-communism and Shinto, the coincidence of these two events is quite interesting because Namba also cited the massacre of Koreans as one of the reasons for his attempt to “get rid of the pro-

utarian delusion of emperor worship” (Senshū Daigaku Imamura Hōritsu Kenkyūshitsu 2004–2006). We must therefore metaphorically view the confrontation between the right- and left-wings, as both confronted the somber issues facing the multi-ethnic empire at that time. Ogasawara in particular was concerned with the Korean peoples’ attraction to international communism under the influence of the Soviet Union (Suga 2004b).

The inauguration ceremony of Chōsen Shrine took place almost two years later. Before that Ogasawara contributed some essays about this shrine to major newspapers, but he insisted upon enshrining Dangun and Emperor Meiji, instead of Amaterasu. He did not join the direct discussion between Shintoists and Governor-General Saitō Makoto 齊藤 實 about enshrining Dangun, but effectively used the government’s attention to his activities to make his ideas known to state officials (Suga 2004a, 119–24). Some sources indicate that the governor-general refused to enshrine Dangun because research had concluded that the Dangun cult was not as popular with Koreans as the Amaterasu cult was for the Japanese. Countering this, Shintoists argued that their focus was not just on Dangun but on the ancestry of Korean people in general. They claimed that the spirits of all great people in Korean history could be enshrined according to Shinto under the generic name of Chōsen Kunitama-no-Kami 朝鮮国魂神 (literally, “deity of the land soul in Korea”), which might activate the Korean people’s faith in Dangun as the symbolic apotheosis of their own ancestry.

In making this argument, the Shintoists identified the fundamental nature of a Shinto shrine as a facility rooted in a particular land and community. This is the essential characteristic of shrines compared to the definition given by the state as sites for the performance of the state ritual. Regarding this, Ogasawara (1953, 76) also claimed that a new manner of worship at the Chōsen Shrine should be invented, combining conventional Shinto and some native Korean religions. Clearly this opinion was supported by the theory of shared Japanese and Korean ethnic origins, a case of “the invention of tradition” in modern society. The popularity of this theory in Japan at the time expressed the fervor that accompanied the merger and acquisition of one neighboring country. As an “invention of tradition,” the interpretations of this theory could also transcribe the contemporary political unification of Japan and Korea back onto a common historical root.

In the end, this Shintoist vision could not affect the Chōsen Shrine itself. In one sense this was to be expected because the actual combination of Amaterasu and Emperor Meiji in this shrine already stood on another interpretation of the identical origin theory of state authority, even if it was never officially declared:

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12. Ogasawara’s activities concerning the Chōsen Shrine were also reported to the prime minister, cabinet members, and high level officials along with warnings from the political police. See Tezuka 1953, 448.
that is, the sun goddess as the imperial ancestor was the origin of both Japan and Korea, and the great patriarch, who “reunified” these two nations that “had been divided for two millennia” was the direct descendant of this goddess. In this expanded irredentist-like sense, the Chōsen Shrine also symbolized the idea that the Japanese emperor annexed the right to conduct the national rituals of the former Korean dynasty along with its political sovereignty. This was a unique characteristic of the Chōsen Shrine that was never before seen in other Sō Chinju (SUGA 2004a, 138–47).

Outside the Chōsen Shrine, however, Shintoist arguments concerning Dangun had some effect. In the realm of academia, Korean historian Choe Namson 崔南善 wrote some works interpreting Dangun faith within the context of East Asia, and these works played an important role in the subsequent development of Dangun nativism (SUGA 2004a, 62, 175–76). Choe later came to be associated with Ogasawara privately. Also, Kunitama-no-Ōkami 国魂大神 (literally “great deity of the land soul”) enshrined in the Keijō Shrine (Keijō Jinja 京城神社) in 1929 was a result of Ogasawara’s activity. This shrine had already been built next to the Chōsen Shrine, and was also dedicated to Amaterasu. Since its original establishment by the Jingūkyō missionaries as an outpost of Jingū in 1892, this shrine had been popular among ethnic Japanese inhabitants of Seoul. But the appearance of a huge state shrine next to it seems to have energized the parishioners of this private shrine. They frequently disagreed with the governor-general about how to clearly differentiate their identity from the Chōsen Shrine. Thus, Kunitama-no-Ōkami became one of the deities in the Keijō Shrine in order to emphasize its domestic character vis-à-vis the Chōsen Shrine (SUGA 2004a, 127–29, 166–69). We must understand that the same deity, Amaterasu, could represent different characteristics in each shrine. After that, Kunitama-no-Ōkami in the Keijō Shrine, who was sometimes referred to with the additional prefix of “Chōsen” (Korea), included Korean inhabitants in Seoul as its worshippers. This shrine was given a state shrine rank in 1936 as a domestic protective deities’ shrine. Although it would also be terminated later, this Keijō Shrine could be considered a success since an ethnic Korean religious group proposed to take over Dangun worship after Japan’s defeat. But the state authority never officially recognized Kunitama-no-Ōkami as an alias of Dangun in spite of such faith of Korean worshippers.

**Ogasawara’s Work in Brazil**

Right after the inauguration ceremony of the Chōsen Shrine, Ogasawara visited Manchuria for the first time. Over the next few years he would energetically promote many events for ethnic Korean students, such as several seminars about Shinto and camping trips around Tokyo. Additionally, some Korean students
stayed at his house in Tokyo at various times. He was still concerned with the Korean communist movement in Manchuria. In this period he also criticized the United States by saying things like: “Present Japan is not the ‘true Japan.’ … The mainland Japanese people, who are addicted to ugly Yankeeism themselves, are not eligible to guide and assimilate the other people in the new frontiers” (Ogasawara 1953, 67, 82–87).

Certainly one of the factors that angered Ogasawara was the American Immigration Act of 1924. Although it is known as the “Act of Exclusion against Japanese Immigrants” in Japan, in fact, the object of exclusion of this act was not limited to Japanese but comprehensively restricted all east and south Asian immigrants. However, together with the persistent “Japanese exclusion” movement in California since the Russo-Japanese War (Dannieels 1962), Japanese society regarded this obviously racist policy as an affront to their contributions thus far to civilization, in other words, to “Westernization.” We must recognize the paradoxical fact that Japan built a dominating multi-ethnic empire in East Asia while she was still under the semi-colonial conditions imposed by the unequal treaties she was forced to endure. This finally ended in 1911, the year following Korean annexation. Together with the Japanese public, Ogasawara shared a complex mentality then swaying between pride as “one of the world powers” and humiliation as a discriminated non-Western nation (Ogasawara 1933a, 114–24).

In 1928, Ogasawara happened to see the actual situation of Japanese emigration affairs when he was asked to visit a Japanese settlement in Brazil by the chief priest of the Suwa Shrine 諏訪神社, a state shrine which had been a major shrine since the prehistoric era in Nagano prefecture. There was a potential project to establish a branch of the Suwa Shrine in a settlement named Aliança in the state of São Paulo, after receiving an offer of land donation by a filature baron in Nagano (Ogasawara 1933b, 54). Aliança was unique among the Japanese settlements in Brazil at that time. Unlike other settlements which generally recruited Japanese migrants who intended to return to their home country someday, Aliança was planned for permanent immigrants but was tied to Nagano or other particular prefectures. The settlement was started in 1924 under the leadership of Nagata Shigeshi 永田 稠 (1881–1973), president of the Nippon Rikkōkai 日本力行会, an organization founded in 1897 based on Protestant Christian fraternalism to support the businesses of international exchanges. Nagata, who was also from Nagano, had organized the Shinano (a classic alias of Nagano) Overseas Association (Shinano kaigai kyōkai 信濃海外協会) to collect official and private support for his plan (Nagata 1952 and 1966; Nippon Rikkokai 1998).

Ogasawara’s departure was reported in the newspapers. Some Shintoists individually applauded him, even though the priesthood in the National Association for Shrine Priests as a whole showed no special interest in his activities. Before his departure conditions had changed due to Nagata’s objections: the offer of donated
land for the shrine would be taken back unless Ogasawara convinced the people of Aliança of the desirability of a branch shrine. Furthermore, Japanese diplomatic authorities were also uncooperative and had been unwilling to issue him a passport because they wanted to avert cultural friction that might result from his Shinto activities in a mainly Christian country. Eventually Ogasawara secured a passport by acquiring official status as a temporary staff member in the Ministry of Home Affairs following negotiation with Yoshida Shigeru 吉田 茂, the chief of the Shrine Bureau at the time (1885–1954, later Minister of Munitions in World War II; OGASAWARA 1953, 87–89). It was ironic that Ogasawara had been under surveillance by the political police directed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, and yet obtained the status of temporary staff in the same ministry.

Ogasawara sailed from Kobe on 20 July 1928, and arrived at Rio de Janeiro on 23 September by way of the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic Ocean. On his way, he stopped in Singapore and visited two Shinto shrines. He stayed in Brazil for three months, excluding a half month trip to Argentina. In Brazil he visited some Japanese settlements besides Aliança. During his one month in Aliança, he visited each settler’s home and eagerly talked with the people. Describing it as “my sacred war” (seisen 聖戦), he zealously tried to persuade the settlers to build the shrine, sharing his conviction that the “Japanese immigrants’ pious worship of Shinto shrines may move the people in host countries. It can turn anti-Japanese sentiment into pro-Japanese feelings.” He famously reasoned with a Rikkōkai Christian settler who, opposing him at first, said “The deity of Suwa is just an ancient human being. So I am equal to him.” Ogasawara finally made him regard Shinto as another worthy faith (OGASAWARA 1933b, 57–84).

Although Ogasawara acquired some sympathizers who yearned for cultural ties with the home country, eventually he was forced to give up his project by the resolution of the Aliança Settlers Committee: “We don’t need any Shinto shrine.” He was permitted to build only a tiny tentative shrine using scraps of wood and timber to enshrine the Suwa Shrine’s talisman in a sympathizer’s yard. His activities were sometimes ridiculed by the Japanese-Brazilian newspapers, and later the Aliança Settlers Committee petitioned the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to prohibit anyone who intended to build Shinto shrines from entering Brazil again. He departed Brazil on 9 January 1929 and arrived in Japan on 23 March by way of the Atlantic Ocean, the Panama Canal, and the Pacific Ocean. This time he stopped in Los Angeles for several days, and talked with Japanese Christians. He also met with a sectarian Shinto missionary and visited his small shrine. In Honolulu he also visited a couple of shrines managed by sectarian Shinto groups (OGASAWARA 1953, 89–102 and 1933b, 57–84).

13. See YOSHIDA SHIGERU DENKI KANKÔ HENSHÛ INKAI 1969. Not to be confused with the diplomat of the same name (1878–1967) who would become prime minister after World War II.
Several shrines in Brazil impressed Ogasawara in spite of his frustration in Aliança: a small shrine in Promissão in the state of São Paulo especially moved him. Promissão was founded in 1918 by the “father of Japanese immigration to Brazil,” Uetsuka Shūhei 上塚周平 (1876–1935). In this shrine, Uetsuka enshrined the ancestral spirits of the native tribe who had lived in this area before his arrival. Ogasawara was stirred by this act, particularly since Uetsuka, although educated, had never received any special training in Shinto (Ogasawara 1933a, 261–71).

Ogasawara was convinced at the time that the genius of the Shinto faith in overseas territories was to deify native spiritual characters and aboriginal ancestors in Shinto shrines to honor and appreciate their works so far—as in Dangun’s case in Korea and kunitama’s cases in other frontiers. This was the first step in settling and immigrating to new territories. The cosmology in ancient Japanese myths composed of “celestial” and “terrestrial” deities also gave him the inspiration to create a parallel model of settlers and natives (Ogasawara 1933a, 4–6, 23–31, 76–83). For reasons beyond the integration of Japanese and Koreans, Ogasawara began considering a general way to embody plural cultures in the shrines and the pantheon of Shinto.

Ogasawara’s View of the Two Colonialisms

This voyage around the world was the first opportunity for Ogasawara to think deeply about the universal characteristics of religions, particularly comparing Christianity and Shinto. He noticed that even some Japanese diplomats despised Shinto inwardly as an aboriginal cult relative to Western civilization. In Aliança, he carefully observed some sensitive conflicts between the Protestant faith of Rikkōkai members and the host country’s Catholic culture. On the other hand, he was truly moved by the piety of many Christians who prayed sincerely even for him, a pagan. These inter-religious experiences made him seek out clues to the universal characteristics of Shinto as polytheism. After returning to Japan, he researched the conditions of foreign visitors to some one hundred major shrines. He also sent out questionnaires to many notable figures in the Shinto world to seek their opinions about the need to establish shrines overseas, and about the relationship between anti-Japanese movements and overseas shrines (Ogasawara 1933a, 298–330).

14. In general, the myths tell the origin of Japan like this: the terrestrial deities exploited the land initially, then the land was transferred to the deities of celestial genealogy centering around Amaterasu’s grandson Ninigi, who descended from heaven. He and his successors formed ties of marriage with mountain and maritime deities’ clans. Then Ninigi’s great-grandson, the first Emperor Jinmu, subdued the central part of the country and founded the nation in 660 BCE.

15. Here I use the term “inter-religious experience” as an analytical terminology for the study of religions, for example, as suggested by Hamada 2005.
Ogasawara’s activities came to be reported by the magazines of The National Association for Shrine Priests. He became a lobbyist for colonial affairs from a Shinto standpoint rather than an anti-communist activist. In August 1931, just one month before the Manchurian Incident, he visited Manchuria and witnessed an anti-Japanese rally. “The outbreak of the Manchurian Incident was the most impressive in my life so far” (Ogasawara 1953, 105). As he reminisced later, from then until the beginning of the Pacific War in 1941, he traveled to Korea, Manchuria, and China very frequently, and met with many people including high-level state officials, officers in the army, famous Chinese warlords including Zhang Xueliang 張學良 in Mukden, the Mongolian nationalist leader Prince Demchigdonruv (De Wang 德王) in Inner Mongolia, leaders of ethnic Korean emigrants, and shrine priests in those areas (Ogasawara 1953, 102–9, 129–42, and 204–37). His activities are quite interesting as a sideshow to the history of the Japanese militaristic advance on the Chinese continent, but only a few historians have noted his lobbying so far. This also indicates that the so-called ideologically “aggressive nature” of State Shinto as represented by overseas shrines has been discussed with some bias. It was a fact that no Shinto shrine in the colonies could survive the annihilation of the empire and State Shinto, but in my view it is a misinterpretation to see Ogasawara as a common agent of Japanese expansionism.

The Chinese calligraphy inscription on the title page of Ogasawara’s book Shinto Shrines Overseas, published in 1933, reads shūri kosei 修理固成, which means “make, order, consolidate, and accomplish” (tsukuri, osame, katame, nase). The inscription was contributed by the incumbent Minister of War, Araki Sadao 荒木貞夫. This famed phrase from the Kojiki 古事記 is the first mandate from the heavenly deities to the original couple of two deities. In this episode, according to this mandate the divine couple married and gave birth to the Japanese islands and the celestial and terrestrial deities. Amaterasu was their noblest daughter. Ogasawara’s book was not for sale, and he said he wrote it in order to familiarize ethnic Japanese emigrants in the world with Shinto knowledge (Ogasawara 1933a, foreword). I believe this book was also written for the enlightenment of the shrine priesthood in the aftermath of Japan “giving birth” to a country, Manchukuo.

This ideal for the Japanese nation to “make, order, consolidate, and accomplish” was a perfect summary of the subject of Ogasawara’s book. He considered the Meiji Restoration to be an embodiment of this providential mandate because Emperor Meiji reunified the Japanese mainland and reproduced the first emperor’s national foundation (Ogasawara 1933a, 24). In the beginning of the book

16. Here Ogasawara definitely understood that his ancestors in antiquity and at the time of the Meiji Restoration had been aboriginal or local people conquered by the emperors.
he defined the “Japanese nation” (*Nippon minzoku* 日本民族) as a generic name for a group of people of any citizenship who were conscious of being imperial subjects. On the surface this seems to be a declaration of the then-existing Greater Japanese Empire’s future ambitions for world conquest. First of all, however, this definition of the “Japanese nation” was originally the premise for his opposition to Japanese emigrants’ cultural assimilation into host countries. Second, this was also an expression of his conviction about the cultural capacity of the Japanese empire to function as a multi-ethnic sphere. For him, everyone who was capable of practicing this mandate could become a member of the “Japanese nation.” This point will be important for understanding his subsequent thought and activities. He fanatically emphasized the importance of Shinto for Japanese overseas emigration: “whenever Japanese people develop overseas areas, first of all we should establish a shrine and express to the deities our gratitude for their grace; we should strive in our business of pioneering and planting under the conviction of our consent with deities. This is the mandate of our ancestral deities, and the universal mission of us, the Japanese nation” (Ogasawara 1933a, 156). For him, the increasing Japanese population was also divine dispensation to inspire overseas emigration.

In the conclusion of his book, Ogasawara compares the colonialism of the “Japanese nation” and that of the “white race.” He criticizes the “white race’s colonialism” as an intrusion intent on forcing their particular manner on other races, and he believed this coercion upon other races was backed by Christianity, a faith in Almighty God. Comparing the two religions, he wrote, “Japanese kami are imperfect. No, those who are advancing on the way to perfection vigorously must be kami. An exclusive being is never capable of this continual development and progress.” He goes on to write, “Colonization by a nation that considers itself perfect requires subjugation, but colonizing by a nation that endeavors to advance to perfection produces harmony. Therefore, the colonizing movement of the Japanese nation must not subdue others, but must harmonize nations with each other, must inspire everyone’s specialty, and contribute to the happiness of human beings” (Ogasawara 1933a, 293–97). This seems an obvious expression of Japanese racism backed by an ideology of the divine origins and unique attributes of the “Japanese nation,” turning white supremacist ideas such as Rudyard Kipling’s *The White Man’s Burden* (1899) inside out. As I have already cited, however, Ogasawara also warned of the ineffectiveness of enforcing Shinto worship by state authority.

For Ogasawara, each Shinto deity was the spiritual essence behind any extraordinary expression, whether in the form of great people in history or as awe-inspiring natural phenomena. So shrines should be established for worshippers who realized the miraculous divinity within those spiritual existences. He used the terms “pioneering and planting, colonizing” (*takuchi shokumin* 拓地植民)
and “overseas development” (kaigai hatten 海外発展), intentionally connecting emigration to the Japanese frontiers, where “Shinto shrines are non-religious,” and emigration to entirely foreign countries, where “Shinto shrines are religion” (Ogasawara 1933a, 76–78). In fact, his term “overseas shrine Shinto” was coined from this perspective of trying to break through the restraint of Shinto’s locality to Japan with his peculiar religious ideas.

Ogasawara (1933a, 106) affirmed, “In Shinto shrines, kami are the subject, and buildings are the object.” This idea was obviously influenced by the universally-oriented Christian churches, based on the faith that God is the subject and the universe is the object in creation. In a polytheistic way, he believed that the omnipresence of the pantheon in the world corresponded to the position of the subject in the shrines. Therefore, he also asserted that any symbolism in conventional Shinto shrines, not only buildings but also such objects as torii 鳥居 gateway, priestly garments, special vocabulary and prayer rituals, and even the location of sanctuary, were considered merely objects. They are changeable in any way insofar as kami would be enshrined as the subject. Following this, he made some surprising suggestions: to express gratitude for the founding of the United States, the spirit of George Washington should be enshrined in a Shinto shrine replica of the White House; for respect to the great spirit of the “Lord of Electricity,” Thomas Edison should be enshrined in a beautifully illuminated shrine; and wherever in the world Japanese people go, even in the Arctic and the Antarctic, new types of shrine buildings and suitable new rituals and prayers should be invented for particular places. “We find the perpetually youthful and vigorous lives of Shinto shrines within their freedom from conventionality” (Ogasawara 1933a, 68–73).

The Militarist Regime and Ogasawara

Mark Peattie (1984, 120) observes that after 1931 the Japanese empire increasingly reflected the “continental imperialism” of Hannah Arendt’s typology, and from that point onward “the empire moved rapidly and purposefully away from any identification with the European pattern of ‘overseas’ colonialism.” Certainly Ogasawara’s opinion about Western colonialism was, as we saw above, on the same track as the mainstream of Japanese nationalism, which criticized Western powers while pursuing the idea of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” later. Japanese cultural nationalism, which regarded Shinto shrines as its emblem, was also escalating at the time Ogasawara wrote his book. But his view on overseas shrines differed from the orthodoxy of the Ministry of Home Affairs, which stuck to its own standard of shrines and manners. In fact, while state administrators often maintained the necessity of “historical precedent” developed from Shinto traditions, their criteria as a whole were invented for the modern nation-state system. Naturally, Ogasawara could not be satisfied with
the status quo of the shrine administration and priesthood. At the end of 1933, as a director he organized scholars of East Asian and Shinto studies into the Association of the East Asian Nations’ Cultures (Tōa Minzoku Bunka Kyōkai 東亜民族文化協会, hereafter AEANC).17 Sometimes supported officially by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AEANC promoted a number of seminars and published several booklets about history in terms of Pan-Asianism. Emphasizing the strong union between two multi-ethnic empires, Japan and Manchukuo, AEANC provided footing for Ogasawara’s lobby. From then onward, he was concerned primarily with shrines on the Chinese continent and Korean peninsula. It is not too much to say that all of his subsequent efforts were devoted to establishing a principle for overseas shrines in order to demonstrate Japanese settlers’ regard for the spiritual dignity of native inhabitants.

In particular, Ogasawara eagerly tried to apply his ideal concerning the “Land Soul” or kunitama as an apotheosis of native spiritual characters and characteristics derived from his own interpretation of ideals for overseas shrines. In Korea after 1936, as a result of his lobbying following the Keijō Shrine, authorities came to promote enshrining Kunitama-no-Ōkami one by one in several local shrines capable of assuming the central position among shrines in each province. But the state authority never permitted this deity to be referred to with the prefix “Chōsen” officially attached. While the colonial government applied Dangun faith on the surface, it erased the Korean origins from this deity's name and turned it into a hollow sign of Korea’s marginal position against the axis of two important symbols of the empire, that is, the Jingū and the Chōsen Shrine which both enshrined Amaterasu.

In the process of constructing the total war regime following the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, AEANC held several discussions with Buddhists, Christians, Shintoists, and scholars. Aside from AEANC, in 1937 Ogasawara also organized a small society to serve as a discussion group for priests and relevant state officials, and acted further to establish an educational system for priests of overseas shrines (Ogasawara 1953, 179–83, 239–50, and 349–54). Although Ogasawara still maintained his lobbying actively during the Pacific War, it can be said that his overseas shrine movement had been defeated not by the Allied powers, but by the mainstream cultural nationalism of Japan that was already evident in the year before the Pearl Harbor attack.

Two cases from 1940, the year of “the 2600th anniversary of the Imperial Era,” illustrate some facts surrounding that defeat. One case occurred in Hsinking 新京

17. Holtom (1947, 157–59) deliberated on Horie Hideo’s 堀江秀雄 article “The Shinto Shrine Problem Overseas” in 1939 as an “adjustment of the exclusively nationalistic aspects of State Shinto to the universalism that ought to inhere in constructive international intercourse.” Horie was a professor of Japanese literature at Kokugakuin University and the chief director of AEANC.
(present-day Changchun 長春), the capital city of Manchukuo. As Holtom noted, the Foundation Deity Shrine dedicated to Amaterasu was inaugurated on 15 July as a sanctuary for the Manchu emperor’s state ritual in his palace (HOLTOM 1947, 169–70). On 18 September, the ninth anniversary of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, another shrine, named the Kenkoku chūreibyō 建国忠霊廟 (Founding loyal spirits shrine), was founded in the south of this city. In this shrine, the spirits of 32,397 dead soldiers from various ethnicities who died during the Manchurian Incident were enshrined. Originally these two shrines had been planned as one single shrine: the Manchukuo authorities—the Kwantung Army in particular—had planned one shrine dedicated to the spirits of dead soldiers. However, Amaterasu was indiscreetly inserted later in this plan. Certainly, this naïve plan for war mobilization by mixing up the distinct identities of imperial ancestor and imperial subject, and the separate functions of Jingū and Yasukuni Shrine 靖国神社 on the mainland were unprecedented; moreover, it might have been open to blasphemy against the supremacy of Jingū in terms of the imperial ritual authority. After 1938 this plan provoked the opposition not only of Ogasawara but also the priesthood and the Ministry of Home Affairs. As a result of several negotiations, Ogasawara persuaded the military authorities to rush to construct another sanctuary for the Loyal Spirits Shrine which reflected the diverse ethnicity of the enshrined spirits (OGASAWARA 1953, 14–17; YATSUKA 1953; SAGAI 1994).

This case was probably the last pinnacle of Ogasawara’s movement. Another case was the establishment of the Peking Shrine (Peking Jinja 北京神社) in Beijing under Japanese occupation in June 1940. As early as 1934, he had already planned a shrine in Beijing for Japanese and ethnic Korean residents to serve as a model for future shrines in Japanese settlements within mainland China. Although he managed to enshrine Kunitama-no-Ōkami as well as Amaterasu and Emperor Meiji in the Peking Shrine after several negotiations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, his efforts were thwarted again and this time more severely than in the Korean cases. At the end of the same year, the Board of Development of Asia (Kōa’in 興亜院, the department of Chinese occupation affairs within the Japanese Government) announced that any deity enshrined in Shinto shrines must be selected from the “Pantheon of the Japanese Empire” (teikoku no jingi 帝国の神祇). Referring to the policy in the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Board of Development of Asia also proclaimed that any tendency to interpret the deities in the frontier shrines, including Kunitama-no-Ōkami, as native or aboriginal spirits would have to be strictly rejected (KŌA’IN 1940; TAIRIKU SHINTŌ RENMEI 2005, 290–306 and 503). The administrative network for overseas shrines between the Ministries of Home and Foreign Affairs and the army was certainly the result of Ogasawara’s lobbying. However, when Japan became a member of the Axis nations as a totalitarian state, ironically his own ideal concerning overseas shrines was denied as heretical and xenophilous by those who took advantage of the network
he produced within the total war regime. During the same period the number of colonial shrines and visitors to them sharply increased. These increases, however, were the result of forced hegemony of the mainland “Japanese nation” upon others in the frontiers.

Aside from publishing *Kaigai jinja shi* in 1953 after the end of the Allied occupation, Ogasawara did not concern himself again with foreign affairs after the annihilation of the overseas shrines. He never went outside of Japan after World War II. In spite of some self-examination on his part, however, we cannot find evidence of his despair nor lament of the past, but only wishes about the future of overseas shrines in this bulky book. He writes, “Shinto shrines are for Japanese people first of all…. But we wish someday foreign people would worship at them, although we would need a lot of studying and time before that day. Haste makes waste. By then, the Shrine Shinto can be a so-called ‘ethnic religion.’ It may be inevitable that the ‘time’ of a Shrine Shinto as an ‘ethnic religion’ exists within the everlasting. But we should never neglect our efforts” (1953, 163–64).

**Conclusion: Shinto Shrines and Historical Monuments**

Many of the conventional explanations about the history of colonial shrines utilizing the State Shinto concept, in my opinion, can be summarized by two theses: State Shinto's expansionism produced the colonial shrines; and the colonial shrines proved State Shinto's expansionary nature. Needless to say, these two ideas comprise circular reasoning that avoids the evaluation of the interrelationship between the state control of Shinto shrines and Japanese modern expansion as historical facts. We also need to consider Ogasawara's scathing critique of forcible shrine worship in spite of his paternalistic opinions and complacence regarding Japanese colonialism. We may have to resolve this question beyond the vague term “State Shinto”: Why was his concept of overseas shrines absorbed by the total war regime? To answer this question some ideological interrelations between Ogasawara, and state control over shrines, must be pointed out.

His thoughts about the deities in the overseas shrines can be summarized by two points. One of them is the respect given to native characters and characteristics. As we have already seen, he was concerned with expressing localism and native or aboriginal traits in each land in Shinto ways. The second is the supremacy of Amaterasu in Jingū. For him, Jingū was the only shrine to officially enshrine this deity as the imperial ancestor. All other cases were never shrines that actually “enshrined” Amaterasu, but merely provided “places for worship from afar.” Amaterasu in these shrines represented the totality of the “Japanese nation” from the inner lands and the frontiers. Like the Jingūkyō missionaries
before him, he believed that Amaterasu could only be worshipped according to people’s voluntary faith (Ogasawara 1953, 7–13).

Seen from another viewpoint, Ogasawara’s concept might consist of two scales of respect for native traits. One scale values the local community where the folklore and cults around each shrine might have been or would be rooted. Ogasawara held that the existence of Shinto shrines was a “fact of the Japanese nation,” and within the borders of Japan each shrine might be a vehicle for the rooted local values against the wholeness of the “Japanese nation.” This wholeness of the “Japanese nation,” then, symbolically demonstrates the tie between the imperial throne and Jingū, and is merely another scale of the local community set against the wholeness of the universe. In his view, the shrines in foreign settlements would be established in order to pierce through the geographical and cultural locality of the “Japanese nation,” just as Christianity broke through the locality of the Mediterranean and European world. His “Japanese nation” was a religious concept based on people’s awakening to the divine mandates rather than racism based on pure Japanese genealogy and blood. In other words, we can say that the focus of his thought was not on the “supremacy of the Japanese race” but on the “supremacy of Shinto shrines” as a group of diversified religious functional organs.

For Ogasawara, the spirituality in each place in the world could emerge once the “Japanese nation” realized its providential call to “make, order, consolidate, and accomplish,” by enshrining native deities in Shinto shrines. A Shinto shrine was imagined as an interface device to localize the universal ubiquity of the pantheon. He imagined this not simply as an animistic world view, but as a type of pantheism, a potential universal religion embracing innumerable spiritual existents who were naturally anonymous. The pivotal point of this pantheon was, in his concept, the taboo against “enshrining” Amaterasu anywhere but in Jingū at Ise by the imperial ritual authority. In his way of thinking, to preserve the highest sacredness of Jingū by this taboo, paradoxically, the divine mandate to “make, order, consolidate, and accomplish” could be omnipresent together with faith in Amaterasu and the pantheon.

In my view, Ogasawara’s religious thought provides some indication of Shinto’s potential to contribute toward a pluralistic society by turning its polytheistic characteristics to its advantage. Of course, at the same time, we can suppose that even if the state had adopted his concept wholly, the results would not have differed so much from the “great Russian centrism” in the materialistic multi-ethnic policies of the Soviet Union under communism (Martin 2001; Suny and Martin 2001), his avowed enemy.

Regarding his position on the Japanese state’s principle that “shrines were non-religious” for the purposes of the separation of state and religion, obviously his view on Shinto shrines was influenced both negatively and positively by the
opinion identifying Shinto shrines as historical and, therefore, “secular” monuments. Viewing shrines as historical monuments had been advocated by shrine administrators in the Ministry of Home Affairs, particularly during the mass shrine mergers in rural areas, but even they distinguished shrines from other ordinary monuments (Fridell 1973; Morioka 1987; Sakurai 1992; Kitamura 1999; Nitta 2000; Sakamoto 2005; Fujimoto 2006). Here the logic for domestic governance in the nation-state had already driven out irrational mysticism. Most of those mergers had taken place during the years he was in a seminary studying to become a Shinto priest. Perhaps this fact had some connection with his ambivalent concern towards treating “shrines as historical monuments” as well as with his definition of overseas shrines which saw through the duality of “shrines as non-religious” in colonies and “shrines as religion” in foreign countries. Of course his criticism of this opinion showed his opposition to materialism.

On the other hand, this “shrine as historical monument” opinion reflected a trend in modern Shinto to recognize outstanding personalities as kami from the viewpoint of the present nation-state; in other words, “historically.” Yet it is composed of ancestor worship and personality cults rooted in Japanese early modernity and before, and is partly derived from the Confucian tradition, but this type of Shinto faith developed in connection with the humanistic interpretation of history that originated in Western civilization. Naturally, this faith had affinities with governance in the nation-state system, similar to the ties between historical monuments and cultural policy. The fact that Yasukuni Shrine, rather than a religious Shinto shrine, has often been regarded as a secular national memorial for the war dead proves this point. Following this trend, Ogasawara’s emphasis was clearly upon the deified individuals and ancestors in history, although he also regarded the spiritual beings behind awe-inspiring phenomena in the environment as kami. As with the state, he also conceived the “Japanese nation” to be a historical existence. But in his view, historical people should not have their names inscribed on secular monuments, but should be revered in shrines as miraculous kami.

Here was the fatal aporia of his thought. While criticizing the “shrine as monument” opinion in mainland Japan, he relied on the international popularity of modern historical memorials to establish shrines overseas. His pantheistic ideal had already retreated here into the realm of commemoration for historical people in the eyes of modern nation-states. That is to say, he was already controlled by the state administration, which had no specific concept of the generic category of kami, the Shinto deities, except as a collection of deities which should be enshrined in Shinto shrines. This administrative nominalism of kami resulted in the formalization of set standards of symbolism in conventional Shinto shrines above theological ideas about kami generally. If all of that conventional sym-
bolism were taken away, what would be left to distinguish Shinto shrines from other ordinary historical monuments for the “Japanese nation?”

Despite Ogasawara’s conviction that “kami are subject, and buildings are object” (1933a, 106), buildings and other symbols “sites for the performance of the state ritual,” as well as the unity of the “Japanese nation,” were the unshakable subject of Shinto shrines for state governance. And when the “Japanese nation” entered into the total war regime, this reversal of roles in the supremacy of Shinto shrines came out everywhere in the empire as the idea of the omnipresence not of the Shinto pantheon, but of the form and symbols of Shinto. The taboo of Amaterasu was also reversed; now not enshrining this deity from place to place became a taboo. This inflated the sun goddess’s merit almost to omnipotence, overwhelming the ubiquity of the pantheon. But in fact, she was also just a proxy because Amaterasu could represent the generality of the “Japanese nation” amid international crisis, that is, the tension between the Japanese locality and the wholeness of the world, and the inflated self-consciousness of the “Japanese nation” came to be projected solely upon this deity.

While I have never visited the Aliança settlement in Brazil, it seems that it has thrived as an agricultural Japanese-Brazilian community for generations (Aliança shi kenkyūkai 1999–present). Every August, a ceremony in memory of ancestors and predecessors, including people who discussed and argued with Ogasawara, is held in front of the great founder Nagata Shigeshi’s statue and monument. The ceremony, following a Christian service, includes some plays and presentations about the history of Aliança and Japanese cultural legacies in their community put on by school children. This commemoration is named Nagata Matsuri 永田祭り (Aliança2 2009). Matsuri is the Japanese word for “festival,” “ritual,” and “enshrining,” and of course originally derived from the Shinto custom. The inhabitants seem to employ this word in order to identify the cultural ties with their ethnic roots, the Japanese nation, but there are no Shinto symbols. I am left to wonder, if Ogasawara saw this matsuri, would he assert that this was also a Shinto sanctuary?

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