In this paper I would like to map out the history of phenomenological sociology in Japan with special reference to Alfred Schutz. Historically, perspectives on Schutz can be divided into two distinct stages. In the first stage Schutz is seen as a contemporary and in the second stage as a predecessor. The main features are as follows. (Ⅰ) the first stage: before the Second World War, (1) background, (2) three representative sociologists significant for the phenomenological sociology in Japan and (3) Tomoo Otaka and Alfred Schutz - an international affair relevant to phenomenological sociology in Japan. (Ⅱ) the second stage: after the Second World War, (1) background, (2) A. Schutz and the phenomenological sociology in Japan, (A) Initiative- S. Yamaguchi's Society and Meaning- (B) critical work - W. Hiromatsu's critique on Alfred Schutz- , (C) a series of serious works; M. Mori's Alfred Schutz in Wien, and (3) International affairs relevant to phenomenological sociology in Japan. Summing up.

If we would like to trace back the history of phenomenological sociology in Japan up to an age before the Second World War, we might specify at least three representative sociologists who contributed to its development - M. Sinmei, J. Usui and K. Kurauchi. They were more or less influenced by the atmosphere of Weimarian liberal culture in the 1920s, either directly through their stay in Germany as government students sent abroad for study, or indirectly through the imported books by which their intellectual curiosity was greatly stirred up.

Of course, generally speaking German influence on Japanese thought dates back to 1890, after the proclamation of the Meiji Constitution. The Japanese government, earnest in following the Prussian model, sent a lot of students to Germany as part of state policy. They were expected to make a contribution to the domestic policy after their return home. But after the First World War, as an indirect result of the allied nations' victory, the Japanese tradition of German philosophy began to lose its highly conservative Prussian
character. On the contrary the mild liberal
philosophy, such as new Kantianism, the
philosophy of Bergson, Dilthey and Simmel
became much more popular. The supporters
of the new philosophical trends were the young
students known as the generation of taisho
democracy to which Shinmei, Usui and
Kurauchi belonged.

Now, when we remember the central role
which the phenomenological philosophy played
before the Second World War, we can not
overlook the greatest figure in the history of
Japanese philosophy, Kitaro Nishida (1890-
1945, 19 Vols Collected Papers), who was the
first to introduce the phenomenology to the
stage of philosophy in Japan. He wrote a book,
The Problem of Consciousness (ishiki no
monndai, 1920) which he dedicated to
Edmund Husserl in Freiburg. Nisida concen-
trated on the development of his original
thought, and established his own philosophical
system through radical disputes with E.
Husserl, W. James, H. Bergson and other
European philosophers. The development of
phenomenological sociology in Japan should
only be examined in the light of this historical
intellectual background.

(A) Masamichi Shinmei (1898-1984), the first to
introduce of German phenomenological soci-
ology in Japan

In the late 1920s, therefore, pheno-
menological sociology (Genshogakuteki Shaka-
gaku) was already known in Japan and was
commented on by the sociologist, Masamichi
Shinmei in an article entitled Formal
Sociology and Phenomenological Sociology
(1928), which was later republished under the
name of German Sociology (Doitsu Shakaigaku
1929). We can find in it numerous references to
phenomenological sociologists in Germany, such
as Max Scheler, Siegfried Kracauer, Theodor
Litt, Fritz Sander, Alfred Vierkandt, Andreas
Walther and Gerda Walther. This would be, as
far as I know, the first book in Japan to review
German phenomenological sociology systemati-
cally. In the same year Shinmei also wrote a
voluminous work: On The Theory of Formal
Sociology (Keisikishakaigaku ron 1928, 627
pages). In the following words from Shinmei we
can sense the enthusiasm of this genius young
sociologist, and how he eagerly engaged himself
in introducing new trends of German sociology.

I remembered that, when I had already
written over 500 pages of my draft, I was asked
by the publisher to complete the book within
100 pages. I have intended at that to keep
writing further, so I felt more or less reluctant to
finish. But later on, in hindsight, I myself
wondered what ever I had intended to write
further.

Shinmei wrote the two aforementioned
books at the end of his 20s. While going on
with his university lectures, he had handed the
drafts, as requested, one after another to the
master of a book-publisher, and had completed
his books in just two years. Prof. Yoshio Atoji
(1913-1996) once pointed out that Shinmei occupied a position between Leopold von Wiese in *Soziologie: Geschichte und Hauptprobleme* (1926) and Raimond Aron in *La sociologie allemande contem-poraine* (1935). This means that Aron was in an advantageous position relative to Wiese and Shinmei, in the sense that Aron was able to review German sociology in general until the Nazi regime gained power. Needless to say, everything has its limitations. I would like to add one word in relation to Shinmei's phenomenological sociology. Shinmei was surely erudite and developed his own unique theory of sociology called the theory of Kouirenkan (i.e., sociology founded on the concept of action-nexus as the synthesis of form and meaning) through his critique on the formal sociology of G. Simmel (10 vols. *Masamichi Shinmei's Collected Papers*), but Shinmei placed too much emphasis on the position of empirical sociology to accept the appropriate idea on phenomenological sociology, and, conversely because of his one sided emphasis on the intuitive method and seems to have had a hand in the mystification of phenomenological sociology. In sum, Shinmei criticized the naive use of the eidetic method and the overestimation of phenomenology in sociology. It is, however, worthwhile to notice that Shinmei already quoted Alfred Schutz in his book, *Shakaigaku no Kisomondai* (*Basic Problem of Sociology* 1939) with reference to Max Weber's concept of action and its moment of *sinnaht* (=meaning) ness (Vol.2 p.173).

(B) Jisho Usui (1890-1991) – a sane seeker after sociology –

We can also find a valuable note which was written by Jisho Usui as a sociologist of his encountering with German phenomenology. In an afterword to his *Essays on Sociology* (Shakaigaku Ronshu, 1964) we can find his attitude toward phenomenology and sociology. According to Usui, he could not get from phenomenology what he was looking for methodologically, but he was deeply fascinated with and much interested in the strict and exact analysis of the modes and constitutive moments of consciousness on which phenomenology performed. He first began to study Max Weber, but was disappointed with Weber's Ideal Type theory, and gradually turned of his attention to Husserl's phenomenology, in which he believed he could find much more certain foundation for sociology.

At the time when Usui began studying sociology, it was not sociology but philosophy that in Japan that was prospering. While on the one hand, the philosophy of Nishida was widely known, on the other hand there was a wide acceptance of the new Kantian philosophy, the leader of which was H. Rickert. Dilthey also came into the spotlight, and phenomenology too, gradually began to be noticed. Usui thought in the situation that a man like himself who chose to take the sociological way, could not help dealing with such essential questions of sociology as; what is sociology and how it is possible, against the antisociological attitude of these leading scholars (p.558). Together with
Tomoo Otaka, Usui studied Max Weber’s Wissenschaftslehre under the direction of Kitaro Nishida at Kyoto University, and according to his notes, during Nisida’s seminar hour only two students, Otaka and Usui, had been ordered to translate Max Weber in turn every two weeks in the presence of their teacher Nisida and other attendants.

From the above we can point out some noticeable features of Usui’s work. Usui sought a firm foundation for sociology in phenomenology. His main concern was with the establishment of sociology as a rigorous science. He was deeply fascinated by and much interested in phenomenology and its strict analysis of consciousness. Usui considered the analysis of the act of mind or consciousness as one of the essential problems of sociology. Usui wrote several important articles, such as “The Study of Socio-PsycIo Interaction” (Shakaisinriteki Sougosayou no Kenkyu 1927), “Meaning-nexus and Modes of Reality” (mirenkan to Genjitsutai 1933), “Understanding of the Alter Ego” (Taga no Ryokai 1945) which showed us his hard efforts to further Max Weber’s methodology by using a rigid semantics of phenomenology, Heideger’s ontology and also the philosophy of Nishida. We can say that in a sense during the 1930’s Usui struggled with just the same basic problem of making a philosophical foundation of sociology as Alfred Schutz did. But we can not find any mention of A. Schutz in all Usui’s writings. Given that Tomoo Otaka was a mutual friend of two men, it is unfortunate that had no chance to discuss the topics with which they were both concerned.

(C) Kazuta Kurauchi (1896-1988), intrinsically introduced the method of phenomenology into his cultural sociology.

Kurauchi was the type of man who insists on the significance of self experience for sociological knowledge. Though he supported the position of cultural sociology in his Sociology (shakaigaku 1962), he basically claimed that the social life is a matter of lived-experience (=Taiken= Erlebnis), on the base of which we live our social life. We can not know the essence of society without what is given as the forms of lived-experience. The various concrete actualities of our social life can of course be observed outside of us, but its basic premises or its basic structures must be given within the structure of our lived-experience. It is therefore important for us when constructing the basic concepts of sociology and forming its scientific foundation, to intuit matters of universal significance from concrete lived-experiences, getting rid of their various special, unessential features. Though sociologists adopted such a method, it was not until E. Husserl established pure phenomenology, that its salient effects appeared in sociology. Kurauchi illustrates the relation of phenomenology to sociology as follows.

It is due to the phenomenon of intentional life that social phenomena are distinguished from natural ones. For example, when a person changes his mental attitude by changing his social position, when a group is
formed or dissolved, when a political idea pushes forward a society in one direction, there always exists the processes which start from and leave for consciousness. Since meaningful phenomena occur only to the subject who can experience them, social phenomena must be directly experienced according to their intentional contents. And sociological regularities must be founded on the inevitable constitutions of the human mind and on the modes of lawful manifestations of consciousness. Now that the necessity of founding sociology depends on a quality peculiar to the mind, so it must be made evident by meditation as well as the axioms of geometry. But under what conditions can we get such an experience of evidence in its necessity and in its universal validity? If the life-phenomena of human beings consisting of the social relationships should be made clear in the necessity, sociological knowledge must refer back to the intuition which is apodictically evident. These objects of intuition must be of categorical forms, which have been rid of specific factors from their empirical admixtures, and which are extremely generalized. Here arises the idea of formal sociology. As the theme of formal sociology we can show, for example, the categories of the group in general, social norms in general, the social type in general and so on. This part of sociology will be ranked to the highest stratum. Into the sphere of the genuine phenomenology can we advance from this stratum. Since sociology is oriented to the expressions of the intentional life of socialized people, there is basically no difference between the object of sociology and that of phenomenology. All sociological knowledge is founded by formal sociology, and the formal sociology can get its last guarantee from the phenomenological meditation being the basic structure of the mind.

Kurauchi (5 Vols. Kazuta Kurauchi 青沼倉雄 Collected Papers) carried out his meditation in order to make foundation of sociology following Husserl and enlarging the evident fields of intuition. In the concrete he developed, in reference to Theodor Litt, in details a series of his ideas, such as structural analysis of I experience I I reciprocity of perspectives I I and Thou I and so forth. He developed also the theory of multidimensions of social reality, of the time structure of society and especially of the dynamic structure between mutual alien social groups.

We have hitherto observed three representative sociologists who took great interest in phenomenological sociology. What they have in common is that they endeavored to give the rigorous, scientific foundation for sociology by making use of some principles of phenomenology, though each presented a somewhat different view of phenomenology. As mentioned above, it was Alfred Schutz in Vienna also dealt with the same problem during this period. If Schutz work, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt, 1932 (Shakaiteki Sekai no Imikousei, translated by Y. Sato, 1982) had been read by these precursors – though occasional reference was made to him – , the constellation of methodological problems in the
academic circle of sociology in 1930's Japan might have been very different. However, all of them lost sight of the very content and forms that Schutz had developed on the problem of the philosophical foundation for sociology. In Japan, it was more than half a century before the real encounter with Schutzian social phenomenology, and this time via the U.S.A.

Before we shift attention to the development of Japanese phenomenological sociology after the Second World War, I would like to mention as an intermezzo the story of the beautiful friendship between Tomoo Otaka (1899-1957) and Alfred Schutz in early 1930 in Vienna. Here I would like to quote a part of a letter from the late Ms. Alfred Schutz dated November 17, 1981 and which was included in the only Japanese version of A. Schutz work which was published in his life time: Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt. She wrote as follows:

May I tell you, the readers,...why this translation into Japanese means so very much to me. When Professor Y. Yatani...sent me a list of books, articles and translations of my husband's writings, a new world opened up for me. At that time I did not know at all, that my husband's work was known in Japan. This knowledge had for me a deep double meaning. Because it was a Japanese scholar, Tomoo Otaka, from the University of Keijo who spent three years in Europe at this time, and took a deep interest in my husband's work. Professor Otaka spent one year in Vienna, Austria, studying History of Law with Professor Hans Kelsen, (who had also been a teacher and friend of my husband) one year in Freiburg in Germany, where he studied with Professor Edmund Husserl, the Founder of Phenomenology and then another year in Vienna, where he met my husband. During this year Otaka spent many evenings at our house with talking deep into the night about the problems they both were so very interested in and a deep warm friendship developed between them. Professor Otaka wrote at that time his book: GRUNDLEGUNG DER LEHRE VOM SOZIALEN VERBAND, which my husband held in high esteem and wrote a 20 page long review about. It is based partly on Kelsen's Rechtlehre and philosophically on Edmund Husserl's teaching. My husband often helped Otaka with problems concerning the German language and Otaka helped with the publication of my husband's book. So it happened that Otaka's book and my husband's DER SINNHAFTE AUFBAU DER SOZIALEN WELT were published by Julius Springer in Vienna at that time. Soon after the publication of the two books, Otaka returned to Japan and after a year at
the university of Keijo he became a professor at Tokyo University. His well known book, KOKKA KOZO RON (The Structure of the State) received the Prize of the Japanese Academy. After Otaka's return to Japan we heard only little from him. The war broke off all communication. Later we learned that he had died suddenly in his dentist's office after receiving a penicillin injection. ...The Japanese version is for me as if my husband's philosophical and sociological beginnings in the past, half a century ago have been united with the present. It is as if the seeds have started to sprout again, so that the present and future Japanese generation of scholars and students can continue and expand my husband's work, inspired by the theories and thoughts laid down in this volume...

As Ilse Schutz tells us, at that time Otaka spent many long evenings at Schutz's house discussing the problems they both were very much interested in. What kind of topics did they discuss all night? Thanks to Schutz's review of Grundlegung der Lehre vom sozialen Verband of Tomoo Otaka (in: Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, Bd. XVII, 1937), we can know to an extent what they discussed. The fundamentals of Otaka's investigation into the social organization were moulded by Kelsen's pure theory of law and Husserl's phenomenological philosophy. It was the pure theory of law which made Otaka aware that social organization belongs to the domain of ideal formation produced by the mind, and it was his involvement with transcendental phenomenological philosophy that led him to investigate the problem of the actuality of ideal objects in general and in particular, the ideal object, Social Organization.

In conclusion, we can say that Schutz gave Otaka's book the high praise it deserved, and that he basically agreed with Otaka's attempt to found the social scientific terms phenomenologically or philosophically. In spite of this, however, Schutz made important criticism of Otaka's work. Schutz was particularly skeptical of Otaka's solution of a series of problems such as, how an ideal object is perceived and how its actuality can be legitimately established. Otaka's attempts of solution to solve this problem remained incomplete. Schutz added that although Otaka took up Husserl's theory as set forth in the Sixth Logical Investigation (in the Logical investigation), he did not adopt the deeper extension of this theory, which appears in the Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, Book I (1913) and in Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929). Further Schutz pointed out that Otaka had neglected the constitutive thematic of phenomenology, (i.e. the question about the constitution of objects as objects of actual and possible consciousness), even though it was indispensable for the clarification of Otaka's problem that he dealt with the constitution of the actuality of ideal objects. Instead, Otaka only appealed to the theory of the noematic core developed by
Husserl in his *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, though the noetic set of problems selected by Otaka has proved to be quite inadequate for solving the question about the ideality of ideal objects. Schutz lastly refers to an alternative as a completely different account of Otaka’s problem in his own *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt, Part II and III*.

Unfortunately, I do not know how Otaka responded to Schutz’s review. Perhaps Schutz received no answer from Otaka. With the outbreak of the Second World War, their friendship and the intellectual communication between them, like a firework, was soon burnt out. Now if I were to summarize what Schutz identified as Otaka’s problem it might be characterized as the problem of principal possibility of regional ontology (I. K. Hellings, 1988), or the problem of ontology of social objects (F. Kaufmann, 1936). The problem which Otaka had posed – how regional ontology is possible – seems to appear repeatedly as one of the basic problems in social science, whenever we are going to reflect on the nature of subjects for study of social science, such as social, political, religious, economic and other types of social institutions. At any rate we must keep in mind that the aforementioned discussions had happened over half a century ago.

Even after the Second World War it took a long time for Alfred Schutz’s works to be recognized and to become noticed among sociologists and other social scientists in Japan. It was not until the mid 70’s that the phenomenological sociology of Schutz and others began to be noticed in Japan, and this was chiefly sustained by a generation younger sociologists, who were called *senso sedai* (postwar generation), most of whom were born after 1940 and educated under the democracy of the postwar Japan. In the meantime the overwhelming majority of social scientists, now as before, occupied themselves with the contemporary issues concerning Japanese society as a whole, such as the political democratization of Japan, economic modernization, urbanization, industrialization, rationalization and alienation. For example, in 1964 to mark the centenary of Max Weber’s birth, a symposium was held at Tokyo University in the presence of many famous Japanese Weberian scholars and students. But there was absent only the problem of Max Weber and Alfred Schutz’, though at the meeting the other various, substantial subjects surrounding Max Weber and his sociology were stated and argued in detail – among them was the problem of Karl Marx and Max Weber including Marx or Weber’s and Max Weber and Talcott Parsons’.

Since the end of the Second World War, the
sociological studies in Japan had been chiefly under the influence of functionalistic sociology from the U.S.A. and the European style of Marx-Weberian social science concerned with the conception of modernity. As we have seen above, even at the end of the 60’s the old prewar and war generation chōsenzenha to senchuha sedai of Japanese Weberian scholars and students mostly discussed Max Weber’s sociology without any reference to Alfred Schutz. Hideo Aoyama was a rare exceptional case when he referred to Alfred Schutz in a footnote to his article, The Action, Understanding and Ideal-type in Max Weber’s (Max Weber niokeru kou rikai oyobi risoukei, 1948) – Though Aoyama was under the spell of the new Kantian thoughts –, he later included the article in his book, The Social Theory of Max Weber (Max Weber no Shakairiron, 1950).

From the mid 70’s the so-called radical sociology appeared as a critique to the objectivistic and functionalistic sociology, but which was imported in the context of American sociology. At about same time, also the phenomenological approach gradually penetrated sociology as an attempt to change the paradigm of functionalistic sociology. But I wonder who initiated the paradigm change of sociological theory in Japan*. And what do we really mean by phenomenological sociology as a new paradigm? In the field of sociology there are certain books which seem to have accelerated the paradigm change directly.

The first book is, I think, Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s The Social Construction of Reality, 1966 (Nitijosekai no kousei, translated by Setsuo Yamaguchi 1977), which helped to generalize the new conception and method. Berger and Luckmann were very stimulating to younger Japanese sociologists, because of their bold stance against the old style of sociology, and by applying the ideas of Talcott Parsons in his The Structure of Social Action 1937. This means they applied to Parsons the very same idea that he had applied to the great works of the older generation, such as Weber, Durkeim, Pareto and Marx; it is a study in social theory, not theories. Its interest is not in the separate and discrete propositions to be found in the works of men, but in a single body of systematic theoretical reasoning (Berger & Luckmann p.29). This message was enough to encourage a younger generation to step forward into the new world of alternative sociology, sociology of the common sense world of everyday life. The younger generation, who had been brought up in the affluent society, consciously or unconsciously wanted to liberate themselves from the old gospel of the coming classless society and from the pressure of great heritages of their predecessors, but they did not know how to do it. They suddenly found their way in Berger and Luckmann?*

The second book is Jurgen Habermas’s Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, (1967 Tübingen) (Shakaikagaku no Ronrini yosete, translated by T. Shimizu and others 1991). Although the publication of the Japanese version was relatively late, not coming until
the 1990\textsuperscript{8}, the present writer read early in the 70’s the original copy printed in the Journal of Philosophische Rundschau. In this work Habermas attempted to take a general view of the new trends of the philosophy of social sciences after the Second World War in the U.S.A and Europe. He succeeded in drawing a picture of the contemporary situation of social sciences, and contributed to the spread of new concepts of social science, for example, of phenomenological sociology. However, the great success of Habermas was accompanied with an unintended result in that the relevant subjects were too oversimplified to allow an accurate understanding of them. In case of phenomenological sociology, he had rashly pushed its sphere of investigation to the limits of the analysis of consciousness\textsuperscript{2} (Habermas S.123), as will be pointed out in detail later.

As the third book we should mention the 1960\textsuperscript{9} second edition of Alfred Schutz\textsuperscript{2} Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (Shakaiteki Sekai no Imikousei 1982) – we abbreviate this to Aufbau in the following -. This book was recently nominated as one of the 100 representative classical books of sociology in the world - along with the like of Thomas Hobbes\textsuperscript{2} Leviathan (1651) and Niklas Luhmann\textsuperscript{9} Soziale System; Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie (1984) – by the Encyclopedia of Basic Books in Sociology (Shakaigaku Bunken Jiten 1998) edited by M. Mita, C. Ueno, R. Uchida, T. Yoshimi, M. Osawa. What a wonderful book it is! The present writer who encountered the original copy of this second edition in the 1960\textsuperscript{8}, in order to understand the book had to struggle with the double difficulties – first with the German language and second with the knowledge of phenomenology. Nowadays, reading Alfred Schutz has become somewhat easier thanks to some excellent works of Japanese translation, as will be mentioned later.

At any rate, as these three books and the like gradually came public attention, it can be said that the stream of Japanese sociological thought in the 1970\textsuperscript{8} began to shift away from the American functionalistic sociology towards the critical sociology of the Frankfurt school, phenomenological sociology and so on.

\* According to Hisashi Nasu \textsuperscript{4}Sociology in Japan\textsuperscript{4} in: Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, ed. by Lester Embree & others 1997), it is said that at the meeting of the Japanese Sociological Society two sociologists - Y. Aoki (1974), T. Ugai (1975) - read their papers which sketched some aspects of Alfred Schutz and that since then, phenomenological sociology in Japan has been almost entirely identified with the Schutzian perspective of constitutive phenomenology of natural attitude, and that from that time the number of papers referring to works of Schutz has gradually increased (p.656).

(A) Initiative; Setsuo Yamaguchi\textsuperscript{4} Society and Meaning

In 1975, Setsuo Yamaguchi (1940 - , Prof. of Osaka University) published an article
Phenomenology and Sociology which was later included in his book, *Society and Meaning* (1982). This article was, I think, one of the most excellent sociological works of the 1970s, and succeeded in outlining the new movements of contemporary sociology and stimulated the discussion of phenomenological sociology. In his paper Yamaguchi characterizes the changing situation of sociology in the 70s as follows; As if corresponding to the Husserlian Renaissance in the world of philosophy, the world of sociology is being reshaped by the so-called phenomenological approach or phenomenological sociology. The conversion is especially apparent among the young American sociologists and it is said that the phenomenological approach has already attained the status of a new orthodoxy in sociology. (Yamaguchi, p.74)

But what does Yamaguchi mean by this new approach? It is difficult to abstract a unified conception of phenomenological sociology. Among sociologists who have adopted the same approach in the various guises of phenomenological sociology, existential sociology, ethnomethodology, humanistic sociology, reflexive sociology and so on, there is not necessarily any unified understanding of its methodology and perspective. And even if they more or less refer to phenomenology, the degree of their understanding of this approach is very much different. From the viewpoint of Husserlian scholars faithful to the original text, there are said to be not a few discussions which are conducted without any accurate understanding of, or even with a misunderstanding of the basic concepts of phenomenology. (Yamaguchi, ibid. p.74)

In his article Yamaguchi outlines the four types of phenomenological movement in order to give his readers an overview of new trends. The first type of sociology is referred to loosely as phenomenological sociology and is represented by Max Weber, W. I. Thomas and G. H. Mead etc. What they have in common is the great emphasis they put on the superiority of consciousness and subjective meaning in order to explain social action. There is no direct relation here, however, to Husserlian philosophy, and such basic problems in phenomenology as the natural attitude, intersubjectivity, etc., are not subjectivized.

The second movement is a type of sociology which clearly introduces the phenomenological philosophical view into its foundation, and which owes its origin to Alfred Schutz. According to Yamaguchi, Schutz was a sociologist who chiefly devoted himself to elucidate what Husserl called ontology of life-world that is, the a priori structure of the social world, within which all sociological phenomena take place and are also understood. Schutz called this attempt the constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude in that complex problems such as lifeworld, intersubjectivity, natural attitude and so on are subjectivized. Beside of Schutz, as exponents of the second type P. Berger and Th. Luckmann are added.
The third movement is the <reflexive sociology> represented by A. Gouldner. In this case, sociology itself is inherent to the life-world which it studies, at the same time is as being regarded as a science of thinking about this life-world. Thus, reflexive sociology denies the idea of an absolute observer. The observer must be fully conscious of this own <restrictedness of being>. This type of sociology is called □ phenomenological □ because it tries to grasp the world either as correlate to the workings or actions of the subject, or as a product of them, and it constantly endeavours to inquire into the basis of the formation of its own knowledge. As far as such an attitude is taken, one must necessarily turn to reflection on the □ natural attitude □ of everyday life, and one must face with the problem of intersubjectivity between the observer and the observed. O●Neil, D. Smith and Cicourel are representative of this type of sociology.

The forth type is the so-called □ ethnomethodology □. This combines the problem of interest in sociology with that in phenomenology, and at the same time builds up its own field of study. Like phenomenology, ethnomethodology takes attitude toward its objects which is different from the natural attitude. That is, it suspends the belief in the existence of the taken for granted objective world. But while in the case of phenomenology what constitutes the possible meaning of the world lies in the intentionality of transcendental consciousness, in case of the ethnomethodology it lies in the communicative practice - explanation, interpretation, deduction, etc., - of the actors who form the concrete situations of everyday life. Ethnomethodology includes the work of sociologists such as Garfinkel, M. Pollner, Sacks and others (Yamaguchi, pp.85-87).

W. Hiromatsu, a Japanese philosopher in the postwar period, praised Yamaguchi’s paper as the first attempt to introduce the ideas of Alfred Schutz to Japan. According to Hiromatsu, Yamaguchi’s paper had the effect of stimulating enthusiasm for the study of A. Schutz. Also important in this respect were K. Okuda’s The present of American Sociology □ (1975) and of Culture and Ambivalence (Bunka to Ryogisai 1975) by M. Yamaguchi and T. Yamagishi’s Research for the Social World (Shakaiteki Sekai no Tankyuu 1977) and N. Shimoda’s The Foundations of Sociological Thinking (shakaigaku-teki sikouno kiso 1978). K. Washida also praised Yamaguchi’s work Society and Meaning. □. In Zuge dieser Tendenz der gegenwärtigen Sozialforschung ist die beharrliche Arbeit Setsuo Yamaguchis besonderes erwähnenswert, die in Konfrontation nicht nur mit der Bewegung der <Phänomenologische Soziologie>, sondern auch mit der Frankfurter-Schule, der System-Theorie Luhmanns, der hermeneutischen Philosophie und der Sprachspiel-Theorie Wittgensteins eine transzendentale Theorie der Gesellschaft anzielt □ (Kiyokazu Washida, □ Phänomenologie und Sozialwissenschaften in Japan, □ quoted from; R. Grathoff & B. Waldenfels Hrsg., Sozialität und Intersubjektivität, 1983 S.391)

As Washida pointed out, a lot of sociologists
paid great attention to Yamaguchi's thesis of metasociological point of view. The basis for his thesis of metasociology lies in that Schutzian theory as well as the ethnomethodology are to characterize as sociology without society by means of underestimation of the intersubjective-objective meaning-context (Sinn-zusammenhang) of society, which act latent behind the subjective meaning of the action, and the phenomenological sociology first could find through the hermeneutical decoding of such meaning-context the point of contact with the analysis of macrosocial structures. As Washida rightly states, in his Society and Meaning Yamaguchi attempted to make critical remarks of Alfred Schutz and his phenomenological from the metasociological point of view, I would like to add one thing further; that is, by means of his metasociological criticism of Schutz, Yamaguchi unintentionally succeeded in initiating the reading public into Schutz's phenomenological sociology. Yamaguchi made a convenient map of the world of phenomenological sociology, in reference to which the reading public in the 70's oriented themselves.

We must ask, therefore, to what extent Yamaguchi's metasociology and Schutz's phenomenological sociology differ? A proper examination of this problem would occupy many more pages than are permitted in this paper. Here we must confine ourselves to listing some of the main points of the discussion. First, just as Habermas had rashly pushed Schutz to the limits of the analysis of consciousness, I wonder if Yamaguchi did not overemphasize the subjective side of Schutz's theory. Would this picture of Schutz as the subjectivist be relevant to the occasional context under which Schutz was discussed in contrast to the American objectivistic and functionalistic sociology? Second, how should we consider the relationship between the second type of sociology - defined as the ontology of life-world, or the constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude - and the metasociology which is defined in various ways - for example sociology of sociology, the knowledge of basic forms of understanding, that of Vorverstandnis/Bollnow, that of der Objektive Geist/Dilthey, that of Vorurteil/Gadamer? At any rate it would be false to reduce the ontology of life-world into the category of subjectivity.

From the end of the 1970's and through the 1980's, the study of phenomenological sociology flourished in its various forms. A lot of books, hundreds of papers, reviews, study-notes and translations were published rapidly one after another. At the annual meeting of the Japanese Sociological Society papers referring to Alfred Schutz and phenomenological sociology were read every year, and several symposiums and sectional meetings were held. Papers related to Schutz usually drew a large audience chiefly consisting of younger sociologists. Against this background, the Society for Research in Phenomenological
Sociology (Genshogakuteki Shakaigaku Kenkyukai), organized mainly by younger sociologists, was established in 1980. In December 1983 the Japan Society for Phenomenology and Social Science (Nihon Genshogaku Shakaikagakukai) was launched. There were, therefore, a gradual realisation of what the late Ms. Alfred Schutz had wished for - that is, that the present and future Japanese generation of scholars and students could continue and expand my husband's work, inspired by the theories and thoughts laid down in this volume.

Now, if from the numerous studies of Schutz published in the 80s, one were to choose the one as the most significant, no one would object to the nomination of the late Wataru Hiromatsu's Genshogakuteki Shakaigaku no Sokei, 1991 (Prototype of phenomenological Sociology - A study-notes on Alfred Schutz) which is recently included in Wataru Hiromatsu's Collected Papers, All 16 Vols. 1996). Though Hiromatsu's work took the style of study-notes on Alfred Schutz, we can not overlook its significance in diffusing Schutz's ideas and its influence on the construction of a typical conception of Schutzian theory. There are at least two important issues on which we must examine Hiromatsu's work in some detail.

The first issue concerns the contribution of Hiromatsu's careful and deliberative introduction of Schutz's Aufbau ( ), the second issue is his criticism of Schutz from the view-point of a Marxian social philosopher, that is, his critical comments about the problem of Schutz and Weber ( ).

( ) On careful introduction of Schutz's Aufbau

Hiromatsu himself wrote the preface of this book. The book was published on the basis of his articles which were serialized seventeen times from April 1987 to October 1989 in the journal, Gendai Shisou (Contemporary Thought). Hiromatsu gives his reasons for bringing up Schutz's principal work, the Aufbau for discussion; this major work of Schutz as a prototype of phenomenological sociology has been widely held to be of first rate importance by scholars and students not only in sociology but also in socio-cultural sciences. Because of its entanglements with philosophy, however, there are many places which are difficult to understand. People often urged me that as man of philosophy, I should try to assist young students by presenting a somewhat detailed reading of the text... It was difficult not to respond to these requests and I determined to answer them in the way of somewhat detailed study-notes on the major Schutzian work, the Aufbau (p.1-2).

In this way, Hiromatsu made detailed critical comments of the Aufbau. Concerning the contents of his book, its eight chapters are as follows: - the Project of Schutz's Social Philosophy - the Arrangement of Schutz's Social Philosophy - Schutz and the Shadow of Bergson - On Schutz's Understanding of the Other (two chapters); Schutz's theory of the World of Directly Experienced Social Reality - Schutz's theory of the World of Contemporaries - Schutz's investigation of Understanding Sociology - Of course here we must
confine ourselves to pointing out some essential points of his critical remarks on Schutz.

Now, where does the attraction of Hiromatsu’s work lie? In the style of study-notes, Hiromatsu filled two thirds of his whole text with quotations from Schutz’s Aufbau, and all his quotations are made up of his own translation of Schutz’s original copy. However, as he always writes in the semi-classical style of Japanese, his notes are not always very readable. Compared to other existing Japanese translations, he took great pains to translate basic words, such as Umwelt, Mitwelt, Vorwelt, Nachwelt, Handeln, Handlung and the like. However, he sometimes adheres too closely to the wording, and carries out overlong investigations of words that extend to three pages - as the case of word kontinuierlich (pp.319-321), to which we should prefer as the proper Japanese word either keizokuteki or renzokuteki (pp.319-321). Thus through Hiromatsu’s study-notes one feels as if one read directly the Schutzian text itself. I am afraid I have never seen a work to compare with Hiromatsu’s excessively earnest treatment of Schutz’s Aufbau.

(…) Critical comments on the problem of Schutz and Weber

For all his cordial treatment of the Aufbau, Hiromatsu takes a critical stance towards Alfred Schutz. And at the same time it must be emphasized that his critical stance is not only in relation to Schutz but also to sociologists in general who are the advocates of a sociological theory of social action.

We cannot overlook a point that appears in the Introduction to his book; as the writer confides towards the end of his work, when deciding to write serially, besides A. Schutz he also intended to discuss M. Weber, G. H. Mead, and T. Parsons as relevant subjects, so that he was forced to publish under the title, Study-Notes on the Theory of the Social Action (p.1).

Thus, in order to reach an accurate understanding of Hiromatsu’s critique of Schutz, we must consider it together with a consideration of what Hiromatsu aimed at through the critique on the theory of social action. We can see Hiromatsu’s critical stance on the theory of social action in his following statements. Generally speaking, we need to sublate (shiyo=aufheben) both the Durkheimianism, which is self-sufficient to social physicalism of objectified (busshoka-sareta) established social phenomena, and the Weberianism which is oriented to understand the subjectively intended (and realized) meaning of the atoms, i.e. individuals and their action, (through overcoming the opposition paradigm (hypodigm) of society substantialism-individual substantialism itself, which lies at the basis of both views) (Hiromatsu p.413). We can see that Hiromatsu’s object was to aim at sublating the modern view of man and society and that his critical comments of Hiromatsu on Schutz and Weber come from this practical-theoretical point of view.

Hiromatsu’s critical comments on Schutz
are as follows. Schutz admitted that Max Weber’s question had defined conclusively’ the starting point of all the proper theory of social sciences’ and on this premise Schutz called for a thoroughgoing analysis of Weber’s central concept of subjective meaning (Aufbau, S. III, Hiromatsu, p.20). But was this possible? He asks to what extent Schutz succeeded in his critical succession = successive criticism (Hiromatsu, p.390) to Weber’s understanding sociology if Schutz’s attempt is examined from the critical standpoint of sublating the above mentioned opposition-hypodigm of the modern view of man and society. In the case of Max Weber says Hiromatsu, one can go as far as to say that Weber could ontologically break through the frame of individual substantialism but he had already gone as far as he could with individualism. It was certain that Weberian-theory of social action was looking for a new way (Hiromatsu, p.396).

What, then, should we think about Schutz? Hiromatsu concluded his book with the following words. Although as we have seen throughout this book, Schutz endeavored to give a philosophical foundation to Weber’s understanding sociology and to develop it successively...... In conclusion, I must say that while he makes many excellent points, in his methodological nucleus, Schutz did little more than enlarge and disclose the difficulties of the Weberian paradigm. It is, nevertheless, as if it were a great rut of the front wheel (Hiromatsu, p.413).

Hiromatsu criticized Schutz in this way. We cannot afford too much in the way of explanation here, but against the background of Hiromatsu’s claim, I think, lies an important problem which we must examine in more detail. That is, the problem of how we should understand the methodological project of the Aufbau - whether or not we should understand it as an attempt to give a philosophical foundation to Max Weber’s theory of social action through Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.

Hiromatsu saw his project in the following terms. How did Schutz behave himself, when he would like to carry out a critical succession of Max Weber? Schutz, Oh! he lives peacefully in the group of transcendental egos! In individual substantialism! To be sure, he surely considers the problem of intersubjectivity. But it is only that of inter-monadic-intersubjectivity on the cognitive scene, and not that of interaction on the ontological level (Hiromatsu, p.396).

If one were to try to summarize the work of Alfred Schutz by reference to the Aufbau alone, as Hiromatsu did, one might expect to come to such a conclusion on Schutz.

However, it was through Hiromatsu’s philosophical interpretation of Schutz that in the 80’s a typical picture of Schutz was constructed and became widespread in Japan. In other words, in the 80’s Schutz’s work was accepted as an attempt to describe the constitution of the social world as a meaningful context in the acts of the individual consciousness. Like a well-known trio,
Habermas began to play an increasing role in defining the phenomenological sociology, partly by analyzing consciousness, as did S. Yamaguchi. However, I would like to refer to a symposium held by the JASHS (the Japan Association for the Study on the History of Sociology) at Musashi University in 1997 entitled Contemporary Significance of Phenomenological Sociology in reference to Schutz' thought. From this perspective, I would like to point out some serious problems that have occurred in the studies of Alfred Schutz, some of which make use of new materials and procedures. It must first be pointed out that some serious books on Schutz have been published by the so-called Schutzian specialists, who, although never having engaged in prolonged study of Schutz themselves, have translated Schutz' works into Japanese and published articles relevant to Schutz. For example, Masataka Katagiri (Schutz no Shakaigaku - Sociology of Schutz, 1994), Mototaka Mori (Alfred Schutz no Vien - (Alfred Schutz in Wien, 1995), Hisashi Nasu Gendogaku-teki Shakaigaku heno Michi (The way to Phenomenological sociology, 1997) and Kazuhsa Nishihara (Imi no Shakaigaku - Gendogakuteki Shakaigaku no Bouken - (Sociology of Meaning - The Adventure of Phenomenological Sociology - 1998), these should be counted as excellent works which represent the 1990's and each of them succeed in providing new perspectives of Schutz' thought.

Here, in order to give an overview of Schutzian studies in the 1990's, I would like to refer to a symposium held by the JASHS (the Japan Association for the Study on the History of Sociology) at Musashi University in 1997 entitled Contemporary Significance of Phenomenological Sociology in reference to Schutz' thought.

What I would especially like to focus on is the proposal made by a speaker, Prof. Nishihara. He pointed to four issues that Schutzian specialists should investigate in the future. That is, 1) the problem of tracing Schutz's ideas in the immanent process of their development, 2) the problem of tracing the relationship of Schutz to his intellectual predecessors, his contemporaries and his successors, especially that of Schutz to phenomenonologists and sociologists, 3) the problem of the historical acceptance of Schutz in sociology as a whole, centered on sociological theory, 4) in what direction should our discussion of Schutz proceed, i.e. as a series of problems of critical succession to the theory of Schutz or as its successive development*

Some of the issues raised by Nishihara have already been dealt with in the U.S.A and Europe, Ilija Srubar carried out a theoretical attempt concerning the first problem in his book Kosmion - Die Genese der pragmatischen Lebenswelttheorie von Alfred

* Studies on the History of Sociology No.19, p.1 The reports in this symposium were published in the Journal of JASHS, Studies on the History of Sociology, 1997. Titles of papers are as follows; Kazuhiisa Nishihara, The possibility of the phenomenological sociology of the later period of Schutz - Two problems of duality and Schutz in the 50's - Tomiaki Yamada, The contemporary significance of Schutz's theory of Science - Yoshikazu Sato, A. Schutz and phenomenology in reference to A. Schütz / A. Garwitsch Briefwechsel 1939-1959 -.

The work we must pay particular attention to is M. Mori's Alfred Schutz in Wien with its subtitle of An Idea of the liberalistic conversion of social science and its period. We must say that this is a masterpiece among the many studies of Alfred Schutz in Japan and perhaps also in the world, in respect of its wide-ranging intellectual interest, its collection of documents related to the matter and of its elaboration on the subject for study. Through this voluminous book of 748 pages, Mori attempted to reconstruct the thought formation of Alfred Schutz in his Vienna period (1889-1938), and he tried to make clear under what circumstances Schutz had come to write the Aufbau, and how Schutz had come to vindicate his standpoint of so-called phenomenological sociology.


The uniqueness of this work, I think, lies in Mori's ideas of putting the context of Vienna, the place of dispatch of thought in the 20th century, which has been completely forgotten and ignored, in the background of the achievements of Alfred Schutz (Mori, p.14). This work should be highly evaluated as the result of the historical sociological analysis of Schutz's thought which a Japanese scholar
could achieve by making use of the many documents in the possession of the University of Constance and also by means of an intensive survey which Mori himself carried out in Vienna, New York and Constance. I think that it is a rare for Japanese scholar to carry out the kind of sociological work that Mori did; going all the way to Europe and America in order to get the data to support his argument, he was able to accomplish his aim of understanding the thought of a Schutz the social scientist against the background of the general movement of his times. Mori’s masterpiece symbolizes that we have now entered into a new era in the globalization of sociological research.

Of course we must not forget the fact that behind the success of the aforesaid works, there have accumulated many sober and laborious translations of Alfred Schutz. The Japanese versions of Schutz’s original texts have undoubtedly contributed to the spread of his ideas. Schutz’s Japanese translators include Shozo Fukaya, Kiyoshi Matsui, Shizuya Okazawa, Atsushi Sakurai, Makio Morikawa, Hideo Hama, Hisashi Nasu, Chie Imai, Masakatsu Irie, Hikaru Watanabe, Kazuhisa Nishihara and Yoshikazu Sato to name but a few.

Through the efforts of these people it has become easier than ever to approach the works of Alfred Schutz. Such important literature on Schutz as his Collected Papers I, II, III, The theory of Social Action - The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons -, Helmut Wargner’s On Phenomenology and Social Relations, Reflection on the Problem of Relevance, Alfred Schütz / Aron Gurwitsch Briefwechsel 1939-1959 and Der simbiente Aufbau der sozialen Welt are today, readily available in Japanese.

In the current rapid development of Schutz studies in Japan we must not overlook the positive role of the personal network of Schutziian scholars who became acquainted with each other while studying in Germany, USA and the other countries or through their attendance at international conferences. We can also mention the increasing ease of access to relevant data by means of advanced communication media and the formation of academic networks of colleagues from the national to the international level.

As Prof. Nasu has already pointed out, some colleagues have visited Germany, the U.S.A., and Canada to discuss their research or study under leading scholars: Richard Grathoff (Bielefeld), Ilja Srubar (Nurnberg-Erlangen), Martin Endress (Konstanz), Lester Embree (Florida Atlantic University), Maurice Natanson (Yale University), George Psathas (Boston University), John O’Neil (York University) and Jose Huertas-Jourda (Wilfred Laurier University).
cultures. This is as true for Mori in the present day as it was for Otaka in the past. Compared with the age of Otaka and Schutz, today the walls between academics in Japan and Europe & other countries have become incomparably lower and thinner. But in order to make the walls still lower, we will need to establish much closer, more reliable relationships and pursue intensive academic discussion in a spirit of tolerance.

Frankly speaking, I think that in Japan the study of Schutz and his phenomenological sociology has, at long last, begun to enter into the serious stage. For example we are, I think, now under the influence of Hiromatsu's philosophical interpretation of Schutz at the 80's. How can we liberate Schutz from the epistemological spell of Hiromatsu and sublate his interpretation? We need to change the paradigm to reconstruct Schutz's ontology of life-world not as an epistemological problem but as an anthropological pragmatical one. To this end, we must make an effort to trace Schutz's ideas in the immanent process of their development, as Nishihara pointed out. In a sense Srubar has already attempted this view of interpretation of Schutz in his KOSMION.

This paper has focused on the theoretical problems of adopting of Schutz's sociological thought in Japan. If we had enlarged the scope of our interest, we could have gotten another beautiful grand scenery. Indeed, some excellent sociological works have been published in Japan which clearly illustrate phenomenological sociological ways of thinking. We can show as some of such works, for example, Yatani Shigekuni's Kenji to Ende - Uchu to Daichi karano Igashi- (Kenji and Ende - Healing from Universe and Earth 1977), Kazuo Seiyama's Seidoron no Kouzu (Composition of the Theory of Institution, 1995) and Masachi Osawa, Sintai no Hikakushakaigaku I, II (Comparative Sociology of the Body, 1990).

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Osawa, Masachi, Sintai no Hikakushakaigaku I, II.


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